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I. INTRODUCTION
Warfare has always been an evolving concept. Throughout
history, it has constantly been shaped and altered by the exigencies of
nations and the moral sentiments of the global community. Yet, the
paramount force behind this continual military evolution is not
economic, social, or moral; rather, the greatest controlling factor has
been the ever-changing limitations of wartime technology. As United
States Air Force Lieutenant-Colonel and Communications Officer
Donald Ryan has observed, "[t]he history of war can be characterized
as an imaginative use of technology to nullify the advantages of
mass."' For centuries, nations have searched for and sought ways to
utilize technological advancements to overcome material
deficiencies. 2 The recent advent of the information age, and the
willingness of nations to utilize emerging computer technologies for
military purposes, may have finally ended that search. Now, with
merely a computer and an Internet connection, an entire nation's
infrastructure, both military and civilian, may be critically affected.
' See Donald E. Ryan. Jr., Implications of Information-Based Warfare,
JolNT FORCES QUARTERLY, Autumn/Winter 1994-95, at 114. As Ryan observed in
his article, the entire development of historical warfare has coincided and evolved
parallel to the technological developments that serve to make warfare possible in
increasingly efficient ways. Id. Ryan continues by specifically noting the inherent
relationship between technological development and the corresponding evolution
of wartime methodologies and instruments: "[t]he introduction of the crossbow
resulted in thicker armor. That, in turn, led to innovations such as the English
longbow and gunpowder, to pierce armor." Id.
2 Id. Continuing with Ryan's reasoning, nearly every military advancement
in history has sought to overcome the power of numbers. Machine guns, tanks, and
planes made the value of actual numerical infantry far less significant. In turn,
missiles and bombs lessened the value of numerous guns, tanks, and planes.
Finally, the modem development of nuclear weapons, unmanned aircraft, and
intercontinental missile capacity has made one military weapon capable of more
destruction than entire squadrons of conventional military personnel.
' See Scott J. Shackelford, From Nuclear War to Net War: Analogizing
Cyber Attacks in International Law, 27 BERKLEY J. INT'L L. 192, 193-94 (2009).
Shackelford notes that a professionally coordinated cyber-attack "could destroy a
nation's economy and deprive much of it's population of basic services, including
electricity, water, sanitation, and even police and fire protection . . . " Id. Many
commentators believe that a worst-case scenario cyber-attack could produce
catastrophic effects equivalent to the destruction and devastation of nuclear
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According to some commentators, the emergence of cyber
warfare is more than just another evolutionary step in the
development of wartime strategy and methodology; instead, they
argue that it represents a fundamental transformation in the very
nature of the concept of war itself.4 The notion that cyber warfare
will alter the inherent nature of war is ultimately rooted in the
conceptual idea that cyber warfare does not merely change the
weaponry of modem wars, but that it represents a radical shift in the
nature of the wartime battlefield.' Whereas every historical evolution
of warfare has occurred within the common sphere of the physical,
tangible world, cyber warfare redefines the central wartime
battlefield.6 Yet, the consequences of actions within this new cyber
warfare battlefield are unique because although they occur in the
intangible domain of computer networks and information streams,
the effects of the actions taken within that domain have very "real"
effects in the physical world of our everyday reality.' It is in this new
warfare realm, most commonly referred to as "cyberspace," that
weaponry. See, e.g., Doomsday Fears of Terror Cyber-Attacks, BBC NEWS
(October 11, 2001), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hiscience/nature/1593018.stm.
4 See e.g., John Arquilla & David Ronfeldt, Cyber War is Coming!,
COMPARATIVE STRATEGY, Vol 12, No. 2, Spring, 1993, at 31, available at
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA485253.
5 See Natasha Solce, The Battlefield of Cyberspace: The Inevitable New
Military Branch-The Cyber Force, 18 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 293, 296-97
(2008).
6 See Arquilla, supra note 4, at 32. Arquilla and Ronfeldt argue that cyber
warfare does more than change the way in which future battles will be fought on a
mechanical level; rather, they conclude, "[t]he post-modem battlefield stands to be
fundamentally altered by the information technology revolution, at both the
strategic and tactical levels." Id.
7 Although cyberspace remains a conceptual location, it is also inherently
reliant upon physical infrastructures and its effects are readily felt in the physical
world-"[c]yberspace is a place, a battlefield, where individuals acting on their
own or in concert with a country, nation-state, or terrorist organization may cause
costly and devastating damage . . . ." Solce supra note 5, at 300. The real-world
effects of cyberspace actions were evident in a test conducted by the Department of
Energy's Idaho National Laboratory in 2007. See James D. Zirin, Abdicating on a
'cyber czar'? LA TIMES (Oct. 14, 2009),
http://articles.latimes.com/2009/oct/14/opinion/oe-zirinl4. In the experimental test,
researchers were able to hack into a power plant's central systems and "were able
to cause [the] generator to shake, smoke, and shut down with a few keystrokes." Id
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many believe the keys to the future of modern warfare lie.8
As states have hectically scurried to gain dominance over this
newest form of military technology, they have also increasingly
recognized the need for international limitations and controls on the
use and dissemination of such potentially dangerous technology. The
United States ("U.S."), responding to the mass increases in threats to
its own internal cyber-security9 , has responded with the creation of
various military and governmental cyber-security agencies"o and
most recently with proposed legislation directly addressing the
critical importance of cyberspace security.'1
8 Dr. Lani Kauss, Director of the Air Force Cyberspace Task Force,
observed in 2006, "[C]yberspace is neither a mission nor an operation . . . [it] is a
strategic, operational, and tactical warfighting domain." C. Todd Lopez, Senior
Leaders Discuss Fighting in Cyberspace, INTERCOM, Nov. 2006, at 18-19,
available at http://public.afca.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-061220-041.pdf.
9 The increases in cyber originating attacks on the United States' internal
and governmental infrastructure has been alarmingly consistent; in 1994, the U.S.
experienced only 250 reported cases of disruptive cyber-attacks against information
networks. See Barry Kellman & Stephen Dycus, International Security, 42 INT'L
LAW 799, 811 (2000). Only four years later, in 1998, that number had risen to
nearly 6,000 and in 1999, the number of reported cyber attacks against U.S.
government infrastructure had reached over 18,000. Id.
10 The U.S. has created numerous agencies to deal with the emerging
threats and military possibilities of cyber warfare; it has also issued several inter-
governmental reports on the topic. A select few of these, and hardly an exhaustive
list, follow: the July 1996 President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure
Protection (PCCIP), the 1998 Presidential Decision Directive No. 63 (PDD-63), the
FBI INFRAGARD program, the 2001 Executive Order 13228 on Homeland
Security, the 2001 USA Patriot Act, the 2002 National Strategy for Homeland
Security, the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the 2002 Cyber Security Research
and Development Act, the 2003 National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, the 2004
National Cyber Alert System (NCAS), the 2006 creation of the 67th Network
Warfare Wing of the Air Force, and the 2009 formation of the US Cyber Command
and USCERT as well as the White House Cyberspace Policy Review. See
generally Solce, supra note 5, at 293-94. See also John Moteff, Computer Security:
A Summary of Selected Federal Laws, Executive Orders, and Presidential
Directives, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV, http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL32357.pdf (last visited Oct.
19, 2010).
" Most recently, Senator Joe Lieberman proposed a Congressional Bill
entitled "Protecting Cyberspace as a National Asset of 2010." The primary focus of
the bill is both the protection of critical national infrastructure from cyber-attacks
abroad and the creation of emergency powers, vested in the President, designed
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Meanwhile, the Russian government has voiced adamant
support for an international treaty regulating and limiting the use of
cyber warfare technologies while concurrently working diligently to
advance their own cyber technologies.' 2 Domestic movements in
other advanced states, including the United Kingdom and China, to
strengthen and expand internal cyber-security and cyber-capabilities
further evidence a growing global awareness of the importance of
cyber warfare.13  Finally, even less nationalistic international
organizations have begun to make cyberspace issues a priority on
their own security agendas.14
The purpose of this Comment is to consider how cyber warfare
is currently addressed by international laws and the degree to which
specifically to allow for quick responses to major cyber-attacks (the specifics of the
proposed Bill will be considered later in this comment). See Donny Shaw,
Lieberman Cybersecurity Bill Would Give DHS Broad Emergency Powers Over the
Internet, OPEN-CONGRESS BLOG (June 14, 2010),
http://www.opencongress.org/articles/view/1917-Lieberman-Cybersecurity-Bill-
Would-Give-DHS-Broad-Emergency-Powers-Over-the-Intemet.
12 See infra notes 120, 262 (describing the Russian military approach to
cyber warfare operations and recent Russian suggestions of an international treaty
agreement to limit the use and proliferation of cyber warfare generally).
" Within the past few years, several other states have begun to address the
issue of cyber warfare and cyber-security directly through directives, legislation,
and domestic measures aimed at developing and protecting national cyberspace
autonomy. In 2009, the UK issued an internal Cabinet Office document entitled
"Cyber Security Strategy of the United Kingdom-Safety, Security, and Resilience
in Cyberspace." See Stuart Malawer, Cyber Warfare: Law and Policy Proposals
for U.S. and Global Governance, VIRGINIA LAWYER, INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE
SECTION, Vol. 58, February 2010, at 29. Several other states have also made cyber-
security and cyber warfare capabilities an increasingly important area of their
military and governmental agendas (particularly, the development of cyber warfare
strategy and capabilities in China and Russia, which will be discussed later in this
comment). See Solce, supra note 5, at 287-99.
14 In 2001, the European Union created a "Convention on Cybercrime" in
an effort to begin addressing, on an unprecedented scale, the problems and threats
of cyberspace activities. See Council of Europe, Convention on Cybercrime,
Additional Protocol/ Explanatory Reports, Nov, 23, 2001, C.E.T.S 185, available
at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/html/185.htm. Additionally, in
2010, Hamadoun Tour6, U.N. International Telecommunications Union Secretary
General, stated that he felt an international treaty seeking to prevent cyber warfare
was needed. AFP, UN Chief calls for treaty to prevent cyber war, GOOGLE NEWS
(Jan. 30, 2010), http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/AleqM5h8Uvk-
jpSvCWT-bqYSglW.
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those laws remain both applicable and effective. The analysis
proceeds in three Parts: Part I discusses the historical development of
cyber warfare and its increasing usage in modem conflicts,. Part II
considers the applicability of current international laws to the realm
of cyber warfare, and Part III considers broad changes needed within
the international law paradigm to allow for the effective regulation of
cyber warfare.
II. THE EMERGENCY OF CYBER WARFARE
A. Defining Cyber Warfare
Any investigation into the meaning of cyber warfare must
begin with considering cyberspace, the newly realized computer and
information domain in which such warfare occurs. The term
"cyberspace" was first used by William Gibson in his 1984 novel
Nueromancer, which detailed the story of a computer hacker hired by
a mysterious employer to work on the ultimate computer network
hack job." In this original context, the term was used to refer to "a
shared virtual environment whose inhabitants, objects, and spaces
comprise data that is visualized, heard and touched." 16 Obviously,
this literary definition has become altered over the course of time as
the concept of cyberspace materialized into a modem reality. Today,
cyberspace is most commonly associated with notions of the Internet,
the World Wide Web, and globally connected computer systems and
operating networks." However, cyberspace has also become
15 WILLIAM GIBSON OFFICIAL WEBSITE,
http://www.williamgibsonbooks.com (last visited Nov. 11, 2010).
16 MICHAEL A. SINKS, CYBER WARFARE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (Air
Command and Staff College, April 2008).
17 See id. Modem commentators have also sought to provide more
simplistic definitions of cyberspace; one such plain language attempted definition
reads, "[c]yberspace is not a physical place-it defies measurement in any physical
dimension or time space continuum. It is a shorthand term that refers to the
environment created by the confluence of cooperative networks of computers,
information systems, and telecommunication infrastructures commonly referred to
as the World Wide Web." THOMAS WINGFIELD, THE LAW OF INFORMATION
CONFLICT: NATIONAL SECURITY LAW IN CYBERSPACE 17 (2000).
Cyber Warfare 607Fall 2011
608 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary
increasingly defined in a military context by a variety of
governmental agencies and bodies.' 8
Within the United States, the definitions of cyberspace differ
from one government department to another. The Department of
Defense has termed cyberspace to mean a "global domain within the
information environment consisting of the interdependent network of
information technology infrastructures, including the Internet,
telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded
processors and controllers." 19 Meanwhile, in a 2001 Congressional
Research Service ("CRS") report, cyberspace was redefined, this
time as the "total interconnectedness of human beings through
computers and telecommunication without regard to physical
geography." 20 Finally, the National Military Strategy for Cyberspace
Operations proposed the following definition: "[a] domain
characterized by the use of [computers and other electronic devices]
to store, modify, and exchange data via networked systems and
associated physical infrastructures." 21
This inability to settle upon a definition of cyberspace, even
within the departments of a nation as advanced as the U.S., remains
equally applicable to the more specific notion of cyber warfare.22
Again, within the U.S., definitions of cyber warfare also differ from
one government department to another. The Department of Defense
has defined cyber operations as "the employment of cyber
1 See SINKS, supra note 16, at 3.
19 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUBLICATION 1-02, DEP'T OF DEF. DICT.
OF MILITARY & AssoC'D TERMS 141 (2001), available at
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/j el/newpubs/jp l _02.pdf.
20 STEVEN A. HILDRETH, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT FOR
CONGRESS NO. RL30735, CYBERWARFARE 11 (2001) [hereinafter 2001 CRS
Report].
21 Staff Sergeant C. Todd Lopez, Fighting in Cyberspace means Cyber
Dominance, A.F. PRINT NEWS, Feb. 28, 2007. In 2006, the Joint Chiefs of Staff of
the U.S. Armed Forces officially adopted this as the definition that would be
utilized generally by the U.S. military. See Michael W. Wynne, Sec'y of the Air
Force, Remarks as Delivered to the C4ISR Integration Conference: Cyberspace as a
Domain in Which the Air Force Flies and Fights (Nov. 2, 2006), available at
http://www.af.mil/library/speeches/speech.asp?id=283 (last visited Oct 20,
2010).
22 See Arie J. Schaap, Cyber Warfare Operations: Development and Use
Under International Law, 64 A.F. L. REV. 121, 125-126 (2009).
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capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve military
objectives or effects in or through cyberspace." 23 In the 2001 CRS
Report, a slightly more generalized definition of cyber warfare was
provided: "[c]yberwarfare can be used to describe various aspects of
defending and attacking information and computer networks in
cyberspace, as well as denying an adversary's ability to do the
same." 24
Ultimately, cyber warfare, regardless of the specific definition
used, has come to symbolize a state sponsored use of weapons
functioning within the cyberspace domain to create problematic and
destructive real world effects. The lack of workable, universally
accepted definitions of cyberspace and cyber warfare only further
exacerbates any attempt to analyze international regulation of
activities, such as cyber warfare, occurring within the cyberspace
domain.2 5
B. The Weapons of Cyber Warfare
While it was formerly the case that cyber warfare weaponry
continued to function primarily to immobilize enemy forces on the
battlefield, this is no longer the case. 26 As cyber weaponry has
23 JOINT PUB., supra note 19, at 141. The Department of Defense has
appeared to remain committed to the position that cyber warfare and "network
warfare operations" are essentially the same and should be addressed accordingly.
Id.
24 See Hildreth, supra note 20, at 1. Many commentators have sought to
break cyber warfare operations into two distinct categories: offensive and
defensive. See e.g., Iftach Ian Amit, Cyber[crime-war], SECURITY AND
INNOVATION GROUP (2010) at 2-5, www.securitvandinnovation.com. The basic
argument is simply that cyber warfare is actually best viewed as two separate kinds
of actions: "on the defense side, the aim of cyber warfare is to protect
infrastructure, military capabilities, and civilian institutions. On the offence side,
the aim of cyber warfare is to target an adversary's critical infrastructure, alter their
view of the battlefield (both kinetic and virtual), and affect their population
(propaganda)." Id. at 3.
25 See Wolfgang McGavran, Intended Consequences: Regulating Cyber
Attacks, 12 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 259, 271 (2009).
26 See Sean P. Kanuck, Information Warfare: New Challenges for Public
International Law, 37 HARV. INT'L L.J. 272, 283-84 (Winter 1996). As Kanuck
predicted in his 1996 comment on the then newly burgeoning field of cyber
warfare, the aims of such cyber based attacks is not likely to be confined to purely
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become increasingly used against both military and civilian targets, it
remains important to understand that cyber weapons actually come in
two distinct forms. 27 The first is the actual delivery method weapon:
this is the standard device actually used as the portal through which
the cyber attack is coordinated and the cyber weaponry constructed.2 8
The second type of cyber weaponry is the cyberspace component. 2 9
These intangible weapons are potentially comprised of computer
programs, network viruses, and digital command operations, and
function solely in the cyberspace domain.30 Since the primary
military targets as the technology of cyber weapons and the increasing regularity of
their use expand. Id. at 284. Indeed, he notes, "[cyber warfare] extrapolation to a
much wider warspace is frighteningly plausible and probable. Strategic nodal
analysis in the twenty-first century will most likely point to financial databases,
government records, air traffic control systems, communications networks, or
automated public utilities as the ideal targets of full-scale aggression." Id. In the
end, Kanuck observes, "attacking an enemy's information networks may go beyond
incapacitating its armed forces; it may serve as the best means of achieving
victory." Id. This understanding of cyber weaponry has two critical implications:
first, it indicates that cyber warfare is likely to become a general military strategy
seeking as its ultimate aim final wartime victory, not merely the rendering of
enemy military forces inoperable. Second, it becomes increasingly clear that when
such an aim becomes the primary goal of cyber warfare operations, civilian and
military targets become equally susceptible to attack to achieve that goal. These
predictions regarding the critical role of cyber warfare in the future of military
operations were also supported by Arquilla and Ronfeldt, who anticipated that
cyber warfare would "be to the 21st century what Blitzkrieg was to the 20th
century." Arquilla, supra note 4, at 31.
27 See generally McGavran, supra note 25, at 261.
28 See id. The point here is that it takes devices existing within the physical
world of everyday reality, such as computers, modems, and connection cables to
build and deploy a cyber attack. One way to prevent such attacks would be the
destruction of these material devices that are at the root of the cyberspace domain.
29 See id.
30 See id. Again, the key is to remember that there is a critical distinction
between the cyberspace domain weapons and the actual physical weapons, far more
innocuous in their appearance simply because of their ability to do so many other
innocent tasks (certainly, a computer is not thought of in the same way as a
machine gun, despite the fact that, in the proper hands, the computer may be a far
more effective weapon capable of killing many more people) used to employ the
cyberspace domain weaponry. This difference between the weaponry of cyber
warfare may seem somewhat irrelevant when the effects of the weaponry are
ultimately the same, but the distinction nonetheless creates complex legal issues
that are explored in more detail subsequently.
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weapons-those used as the delivery method-are present in almost
every aspect of our daily lives, it is the second kind of cyber
weaponry, functioning only within the cyberspace domain, that have
become the focus of State development in the cyber warfare
context.3 1 Although constantly evolving, the most common types of
cyber domain weapons, including their basic functions, capabilities,
and uses, are outlined below.
1. Denial-of-Service
A denial-of-service ("DoS") attack is defined as an "assault on
a network that floods it with so many additional requests that regular
traffic is either slowed or completely interrupted".32 Generally, DOS
attacks work by crippling a website or computer network resource
and making it unusable by overwhelming the resource with a massive
amount of information requests, resulting in an inability to respond to
legitimate information and data requests.33
31 A simple example may be illustrative: a state conducting cyber warfare
operations requires two weapons to carry out its attack. First, it requires the
delivery weapon (likely a computer and internet connection); second, it also
requires some cyberspace weaponry to be transported across the cyberspace
domain and intended to affect the ability of an enemy's functioning within the
cyberspace domain. Since it is not difficult to acquire primary delivery weapons -
computers are available globally and expense is not a likely deterrent to a state
conducting cyber warfare operations - it is the secondary weapons, operating
within cyberspace alone, that are preciously sought after by state governments
interested in employing cyber warfare. These cyberspace domain weapons,
therefore, are the key to the conducting of cyber warfare operations generally.
32 See TechEncyclopedia, Denial of Service Attack, TECHWEB.COM,
http://www.techweb.com/encyclopedial (search "Denial of Service Attack"; then
follow "Look Up" hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 6, 2010). Generally, there seems to
be basic agreement amongst international cyber warfare commentators that these
types of attacks are the most common form of cyber warfare weaponry because of
their simplicity and overall effectiveness in disrupting computer network functions.
See generally Mindi McDowell, Understanding Denial of Service Attacks, U.S.
COMPUTER EMERGENCY READINESS TEAM (2004), http://www.us-
cert.gov/cas/tips/ST04-015.html.
" See McDowell, supra note 32. See also Managing the Threat of Denial-
of-Service Attacks, CERT COORDINATION CENTER, (2001),
http://www.cert.org/archive/pdf/ManagingDoS.pdf. According to the CERT, a
DoS attack is intended to hinder the operation of a computer network service by
Cyber Warfare 611Fall 2011
612 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law. Judiciary
A distributed-denial-of-service (DDoS) attack operates similarly
to a standard DoS attack, but involves the coordination and use of
numerous pre-infected computers working in unison to disable a
single, targeted computer network or service.34 Specifically, "an
aggressor utilizes thousands of infected computers-known as
zombies or bots-to concurrently attack a single system."35 DDoS
attacks remain an attractive and effective cyber warfare weapon
because they exponentially increase the power of standard DoS
attacks and are available at relatively low cost.36  Consequently,
according to one commentator, a state could "fund an entire cyber
warfare campaign for the cost of replacing a tank tread [and] would
be foolish not to." 37
2. Malicious Programs
Malicious programs, or malware, typically operate by
"disrupting normal computer functions, or by opening a back door
for a remote attacker to take control of the computer."38 Viruses, the
"explicit[ly] attempt[ing] . . . to prevent legitimate users of a computer-related
service from using that service." Id.
34 See Schaap, supra note 22, at 134.
35 Id.
31 See McGavran, supra note 25, at 262. See also John Markoff, Cyber
Attack Preceded Invasion, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 13, 2008),
http://archives.chicagotribune.com/2008/aug/13/business/chi-cyber-war. DDoS
attacks also remain a highly attractive cyber warfare option because they originate
from multiple computers located in several locations and thus, are increasingly
difficult to trace. See Kevin Coleman, Department of Cyber Defense, An
Organization who's time has come!, TECHNOLYTICS, 2 (Nov. 2007),
http://www.technolytics.com/Dept of Cyber Defense.pdf.
1 See McGavran, supra note 25, at 262-63.
" See Schaap, supra note 22, at 135. See generally Clay Wilson, Cong.
Research Serv. Rep. For Cong. No. RL32114, Computer Attack and Cyber
Terrorism: Vulnerabilities and Policy Issues for Congress 15, 21 (Oct. 17, 2003),
available at http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL32114.pdf. One of the primary appeals of
malicious software is that it can be configured to either immediately disable an
infected computer, or it may operate on a time delay, disabling the infected
computer only after being remotely prompted to carry out its disabling commands.
Id. at 35. Further, malicious programs may also operate to disable the infected
computer directly or they may take over the infected computer and cause it to issue
commands disabling or disrupting other computer networks. Id.
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most common form of malicious programming, may function to
delete certain computer files or make such files unusable. 39
Specifically, a virus attaches itself to a computer program or file and
spreads from one computer to another, moving across computer
networks by way of self-replication.40 Additionally, a virus will
typically carry a "payload"- a side effect of the virus that normally
functions to corrupt or destroy computer data on the infected
computer. 4 1 Viruses typically have the ability to remain discretely
present within an infected computer, only becoming destructive when
a user runs or opens the software to which the malicious program has
been attached.42
The other common form of malicious programming, a worm,
functions similarly by spreading from one computer to another and
eventually infecting an entire computer network.43 However, a worm
differs from a virus in that it is both capable of traveling across a
computer system without aid from individual computer users and it is
capable of directly replicating itself thousands of times within a
single computer.44 Worms tend to consume massive amounts of
memory, and as a result, infected computers, and the networks they
operate on, often become unresponsive. 45  With recent cyber
3 See The Tech Terms Computer Dictionary, Malware, TECHTERMS.COM,
http://www.techterms.com/definition/malware (last visited Oct. 24, 2010).
40 Introduction to Computer Viruses, SOPHOS.COM (May 26, 1998),
http://www.sophos.com/en-us/press-office/press-
releases/i 998/05/vavirusesintro.aspx.
41 Id.
42 See Vangie Beal, The Difference Between a Virus, Worm, and Trojan
Horse, WEBOPEDIA.COM (June 29, 2010),
http://www.webopedia.com/DidYouKnow/Intemet/2004/virus.asp. The concept
that malicious software may exist on a computer benignly until activated by the
computer user is known generally as an attachment to an executable file. Id.
43 Id.
4 Id. Unlike a virus, which both requires a computer user to actively open
or start the software containing the malicious program and the virus to spread to
other computers to replicate itself, a worm is able to activate on its own and
replicate on a single computer. Id. These key features make the worm a more
sophisticated and dangerous form of computer virus, as one computer infected with
a worm may subsequently send out thousands of self-replicated copies to other
computers operating on the same network. Id.
45 Id.
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advances, worms may now allow individuals to tunnel into computer
systems and even remotely control the infected computer. 46
3. Logic Bombs
Logic bombs, a more advanced type of malicious
programming, only execute their destructive effects when triggered
by particular events occurring at a pre-determined time.47 A logic
bomb can sit dormant for long periods of time unsuspected and then
be activated, making its effects far more likely to be wide-spread than
if its' malicious impact was readily apparent. 48  Once activated, a
logic bomb may cause severe damage to the infected computer,
rendering it entirely unusable, deleting specific data, or even
functioning to activate a more complex DOS attack.49
4. IP Spoofing
Also known as IP address forgery, IP spoofing is a kind of
hijacking technique that allows the hacking user to operate a
46 Id. Another critical and more general recent development has been the
emergence of polymorphic malware, which allows the malicious software to alter
its signature randomly every time it replicates and spreads to another computer. See
generally Glossary, Polymorphic Malware, INTERNETSECURITYZONE.COM,
http://www.internetsecurityzone.com/Glossary/Polymorphic Malware (last visited
Oct. 26, 2010). The emergence of polymorphic malware allows worm and virus
malware to avoid detection by anti-malware programs designed to recognize
malware by its specific signature and characteristics, while simultaneously not
affecting the ability of the malicious program to disrupt the functions of the
infected computers. Id.
" See Coleman, supra note 36. See also What is a logic bomb?, TECH-
FAQ.coM, http://tech-faq.com/logic-bomb.shtml (last visited Oct. 28, 2010).
48 See David Hoffman, CIA Slipped Bugs to Soviets, THE WASHINGTON
POST (Feb. 26, 2004),
http://www.industrialdefender.com/generaldownloads/incidents/ 1982.06 transsi
beriangaspipelineexplosion.pdf. As Hoffman discusses in his article, this type
of cyber warfare technology has been readily available and was allegedly utilized
as far back as the Cold War Era by the CIA to destroy a Soviet natural gas pipeline.
Id.
49 See Coleman, supra note 36.
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computer while appearing as a trusted host.50 By thus concealing his
true identity, the hacker can gain access to computer networks and
network resources.si When hijacking a network Internet browser, any
computer using the browser upon entering a URL is taken to a
fraudulent webpage mirroring the entered site page, but created by
the hijacker.52 The moment the user interacts with any of the content
of the fraudulent webpage, the hijacking user gains the ability to
access sensitive network information or the computer's fundamental
programming features. 53
5, Trojan Horses
Trojan horses, as the name implies, operate as a kind of
malicious software based on fooling targeted computers into
believing that the malicious program will actually perform a useful or
desired function.5 4 Instead, the Trojan horse acquires unauthorized
access to the infected computer.55 Subsequently, the Trojan horse
programming allows a remote user to access the infected computer
and may also cause the infected computer to serve as a resource in
later DOS attacks. 56
These key weapons of cyber warfare are becoming increasingly
accessible to an ever-growing number of states.57 Recent studies have
s0 See IP Spoofing, (IP address forgery or a host file hijack),
SEARCHSECURITY.COM, http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/definition/IP-
spoofing (last visited Oct. 28, 2010).
5" See id.
52 Id.
5 Id.
5 See, e.g., Targeted Trojan Email Attacks, U.S. COMPUTER EMERGENCY
CENTER (July 8, 2005), http://www.us-cert.gov/cas/techalerts/TAO5-189A.html.
ss Id.
56 See McDowell, supra note 32. Trojan horses are key cyber warfare
weapons because they both allow a remote user to acquire access to an infected
computer at any time after infection and also to use the infected computer in later
DoS attacks requiring several computers to jam other network services, or
computer programs operating on different servers. Id.
" See generally Kevin Coleman, The Cyber Arms Race has Begun, CSO
ONLINE (Jan. 28, 2008),
http://www.csoonline.com/exclusives/column.html?CID=33496.
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determined that, given the modest costs involved in conducting basic
cyber warfare operations, nearly 140 states have operational cyber
warfare programs." The availability of cyber warfare weaponry, and
the potentially devastating effects that such weapons may have on an
enemy's critical infrastructures during global conflict, further
indicate the paramount importance of understanding the legal
implications of cyber warfare. The increased willingness to engage in
cyber warfare operations, examples of which form the basis of the
following Part of this comment, make clear the immediate need for
such consideration.59
C. Modern Proliferation: Instances of Cyber Warfare in Our
Contemporary World
1. Estonia
In April of 2007, one of the world's most Internet-dependent
nations, Estonia, came under severe and crippling cyber attack.6 0 The
DDoS attack ultimately left the nation in cyber shambles: only hours
after the attack, the web sites of Estonia's leading banks, newspapers,
and major government agencies had crashed, thrusting the nation into
cyberspace isolation.61
58 Id.
59 See infra note 277 (Discussing the importance of regulating cyber
warfare operation now, while it remains in its infantile stages of development and
prior to becoming a permanent and critical fixture of states' military strategy).
60 See Joshua Davis, Hackers Take Down the Most Wired Country in
Europe, WIRED MAG (Aug. 21, 2007),
http://www.wired.com/politics/security/magazine/15-
09/ff estonia?currentPage=all. Estonians use the Internet, and Internet based
services, for nearly every aspect of their daily lives; Estonians manage their
personal banking primarily over the Internet, and Estonians can even vote in
national elections online. See Sutton Meagher, Comment, When Personal
Computers are Transformed into Ballot Boxes: How Internet Elections in Estonia
Comply with the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, 23 Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 349, 356 (2008). This massive reliance on the
Internet for everyday living in Estonia has even led some commentators to refer to
Estonia as "E-stonia". See, e.g., Indranjit Basu, Estonia becomes E-stonia, DIGITAL
COMMUNITIES (Apr. 9, 2008), http://www.govtech.com/dc/articles/284564.
61 See Davis, supra note 60. See also Johnny Ryan, Growing Dangers:
Emerging and Developing Security Threats, NATO REv. (Winter 2007),
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Some believe, and Estonia publicly indicated its belief, that
Russia was responsible for the attacks.62 However, the attacks
http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2007/issue4/english/analysis2.html. The
DDoS attacks targeted and paralyzed the most critical Estonian web sites and were
particularly aimed at the web sites of the president, parliament, political ministries
and parties, major news outlets, and Estonia's two major banks. Id. The DDoS
attacks worked by overloading the Estonian web sites with so much request
information that the servers backed up to the point of shutting down altogether. Id.
According to the Estonian Defense Minister, the sites, normally visited around
1,000 times per day, were under cyber bombardment of nearly 2,000 visits and
requests per second. See Steven L. Meyers, Estonia Accuses Russia of Computer
Attacks, N.Y. TIMES (May 18, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/18/world/europe/1 8cnd-russia.htmll 7h.. The
DDoS attack was, in fact, a combination of several simultaneously occurring DDoS
attacks, and at the time of the attack nearly 130 identifiably different DDoS attacks
were targeting and disrupting Estonian Internet infrastructures. See Sean Kerner,
Estonia Under Russian Cyber Attack?, INTERNETNEWS.COM, (May 18, 2007),
http://www.internetnews.com/security/article.php/3678606/Estonia+Under+Russia
n+Cyber+Attack.htm. Internet traffic increased dramatically during the attack, and
the units of actual data being transmitted on Estonian servers increased from
20,000 to over 4 million units per second during the course of the DDoS attacks. Id.
62 See A Cyber Riot: Estonia and Russia, THE ECONOMIST, May 12, 2007,
available at http://www.economist.com/node/9163598. Russia denied, and
continues to deny, all involvement in the attacks. Id. However, several of the
original domains for the initial attacks were traced by security officials to Russian
servers, some of which were actually registered directly to the Russian government
and then President Putin. See Meyers, supra note 61. Even after Estonia reported
the attacks to the EU and NATO, the Kremlin continued to adamantly deny
responsibility for the attacks. Id. Many continue to maintain, however, that the
DDoS attack was Russian retaliation for Estonian officials relocating a Soviet-era
bronze statute, called the Soldier of Tallinn, from the Estonian capitol to an
international military cemetery outside the city. See A Cyber Riot, THE ECONOMIST,
May 12, 2007. Ethnic Russians, who comprise nearly one fourth of the Estonian
population, and the Russian Government objected to the movement, which they
viewed as an insult and marginalization of Estonia's Russian historic heritage. Id.
The Russian government even called the actions "blasphemous" and the Estonian
authorities were faced with riots by some of the ethnic Russian population. Id. Still
others have contended that the attack was an attempt by Russia to test both the
West's preparedness for such a cyber attack, as well as NATO's commitment to its
newest and smallest members (Estonia had become a member of NATO in 2004).
See Anne Applebaum, For Estonia and NATO, A New Kind of War, WASH. POST,
May 22, 2007, at Al5, available at http://www.nato.int/structur/countries.htm.
After Estonia asked for cyber assistance from NATO, and shortly after NATO
cyber experts arrived in Estonia, the attacks stopped in their entirety. See Cyber
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originated from several other nations, and the nature of the DDoS
attacks themselves made tracing the ultimate source impossible. 63
Ultimately, the attack on Estonia demonstrated "several disturbing
realities."64 It displayed the extremity of the attribution problem in
cyber attacks, the ease with which devastating cyber attacks may be
employed, and the real world destruction that may be caused by
attacks carried out solely in the cyberspace domain. 65
War as the Ultimate Weapon, STRATEGYWORLD.COM, (Jan. 5, 2008),
http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htiw/articles/20080105.aspx.
61 See Frontline: Cyberwar!, (PBS television broadcast Apr. 24, 2003),
available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/cyberwarfar/. The
DDoS servers responsible for the attacks originated from several locations,
including the United States, Egypt, South America, and Russia. See Davis, supra
note 60; see also Shackelford, supra note 3, at 203. The ability to identify the
source of DDoS attacks is always practically impossible because of the fact that the
actual attacks are not necessarily, or even normally, carried out by the attacker. See
Schaap, supra note 22, at 134. In a typical DDoS attack, as seen in the attacks
against Estonia, a central controlling computer system will often initiate the attack,
which will actually be carried out, unbeknownst to the computer users, by other
infected computer systems located all around the globe. Id. The resulting
anonymity of the initial computer user, who initiates the attack but may not even
actually participate in the attack itself, is one of the most attractive characteristics
of a DDoS attack. Id. The anonymity afforded by use of DDoS attack was on full
display nearly a decade earlier than the attack on Estonia when, in 1998, the "Solar
Sunrise" attacks on United States Department of Defense computer systems
occurred. See Christopher Joyner & Catherine Lotrionte, Information Warfare as
International Coercion: Elements of a Legal Framework, 12 EUR. J. INT'L L. 825,
839-840 (2001). Computers registered and located within the United Arab Emirates
carried out the DDoS attacks in this case; however, it was a young Israeli and two
high schools students from California, and not the UAE, who had initiated the
attacks. See JOHNATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FuTuRE OF THE INTERNET AND How TO
STOP IT 37-45 (2008); see also Solar Sunrise, GLOBALSECURITY.ORG,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/solar-sunrise.htm (last visited Oct. 25,
2010). The teenagers took advantage of the "global integration of the Internet" to
hide the origin of the true source of the attacks while manipulating the DDoS attack
locations to make it appear as though the attacks had originated from the UAE. See
Shackelford, supra note 3, at 204. If high school students are able to sufficiently
hide the true origins of their simple DDoS attack designs, imagine the difficulty in
tracing highly specialized cyber warfare professionals.
64 McGavran, supra note 25, at 265.
65 Id.
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2. Georgia
In 2008, Georgia, responding to separatist actions, launched
surprise aerial and ground attacks against the revolutionary forces
located in the provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.66 Shortly
thereafter, a simple, yet crippling DDoS attack hit several of
Georgia's government and media websites.67 These initial cyber
attacks were traced to commanding servers in Russia. 68 Although
there remains no direct evidence of Russian government
involvement, the subsequent actions make some degree of Russian
State involvement seem far more likely.69 Only a short while after the
66 See McGavran, supra note 25, at 265. McGavran also notes that much of
the international community, including NATO and the U.S., criticized this
offensive military action by Georgia. Id at n. 47. Nevertheless, he does not seem to
indicate that these criticisms were in any way a condolence of the subsequent
Russian reprisals taken against Georgia. Id at 265.
67 See Jeremy Kirk, Estonia, Poland Help Georgia Fight Cyber Attacks,
CIO (Aug. 12, 2008),
http://www.cio.com/article/443314/EstoniaPolandHelp GeorgiaFightCyber
Attacks. The attacks specifically included hijacking and defacing government sites
such as the official website of Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili. Id. On the
President's website, the site appearance had been altered and anyone visiting the
site was prompted to a photo gallery displaying President Saakashvili's picture
juxtaposed next to images of Adolf Hitler. Id. Although the DDoS attack was very
similar to the cyber attack on Estonia only a year before, the effects of the attacks
in Georgia were far less. Id. However, Kirk notes, it is critical that the reason for
this lesser effect is not that the cyber attack method was less effective, but merely
that Georgia is not nearly as reliant upon Internet infrastructure as the more
advanced Estonian state. Id. Perhaps more critically, Georgian military IT systems
were affected by these attacks. See Brian Krebs, Report: Russian Hacker Forums
Fueled Georgia Cyber Attacks, WASH. PosT (Oct. 16, 2008),
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/securityfix/2008/1 0/report russian hackers foru
ms f.html. The Georgian air defense systems were heavily affected and Georgian
military command and control operations were, for some time, operated solely
through U.S. government and unsecured Google accounts. Id.
68 See Kirk, supra note 67.
69 See id.; Iftach Ian Amit, Cybercrime/War: Linking State Governed Cyber
Warfare with Online Criminal Groups, SECURITY AND INNOVATION,
http://www.securityandinnovation.com (last visited Oct. 12, 2010). Amit argues
that professionally hired criminal groups, centered in Russia and employed as
freelance cyber warfare mercenaries, were responsible for the actions against
Georgia. Id. Although a fascinating notion, the fact remains, as Kirk notes in his
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initial cyber attacks on Georgian websites, Russian army, navy, and
air forces formed the heart of a kinetic military offensive against the
territorial sovereignty of the Georgian State. 70 The ability to coincide
cyber attacks with conventional military offensives makes for an
efficiently devastating combination and, in the current state of
international legal uncertainty surrounding the state-sponsored use of
cyber attacks, they may become more and more prevalent as a
general military strategy.71
article on the cyber attacks in Georgia, that the Russian government has adamantly
denied responsibility for the attacks and the lack of direct evidence linking the
cyber attacks and Russian state sponsorship are the more legally persuasive
arguments. See Kirk, supra note 67. Nonetheless, it has been further noted that
Russian state involvement in the attacks seemed highly likely because of the high
level of preparation and advanced reconnaissance employed in executing the
attacks. See Krebs, supra note 67.
70 See Markoff, supra note 36. Markoff notes that the initial attacks on the
Georgia government and media sites began roughly one month before the actual
Russian military offensive and the beginning of the Georgian War. Id. He suggests
that these may have served as preliminary attacks to test their efficiency, and
expected full-scale usage during the impending, actual conflict. Id. After the
Russian military offensive against Georgia ended, the cyber attacks against the
Georgian sites continued for some time before finally dying down. Id. Even then, it
has been argued that the eventual ability of Georgia to overcome the ongoing cyber
attacks against its official web sites was likely due, in large part, to the extensive
assistance given by the far more Internet savvy Estonian and Polish states to the
Georgian authorities in mitigating the damage of the attacks and creating more
secure server space for the targeted web sites. See Kirk, supra note 67; see also
Eneken Tuck Et Al., Cyber Attacks Against Georgia: Legal Lessons Identified 4,
Coop. CYBER DEF. CTR. OF EXCELLENCE (2008),
http://www.carlisle.army.mil/DIME/documents/Georgia%201 %200.pdf.
71 See Siobhan Gorman, Cyberattacks on Georgian Web Sites are
Reigniting a Washington Debate, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 14, 2008),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 121867946115739465.html?mod=googlenewswsj
. The general reason for this trend may simply be that states generally, with the lack
of clear and precise international legal standards, do not consider such cyber
attacks to be warfare weapons and hence, are permissible forms of wartime
strategy. Id. As Scott Borg, the director of the U.S. Cyber Consequences Unit, has
stated, "we are in a world where governments have not decided whether the tools
of cyberattacks are weapons [and] [w]e don't have any really clear international
understandings about these matters." Id.
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3. Iran
In 2009, two events relating to the volatile Iranian state further
evidenced the power, utility, and growing use of cyber warfare in
modem military strategy. First, following the 2009 Iranian elections,
there erupted what FOX News termed a "full-on guerrilla cyberwar"
between the Iranian government and dissatisfied domestic
movements protesting the national elections. 7 2 In response to what
many Iranians felt was an unfair election, the movements began
coordinating demonstrations and undertaking efforts to bring down
key government web sites. 7 3 The internal forces working to subvert
the Iranian government were coordinating their activities through
Twitter, a U.S.-based online communications and posting web
application.74 Despite the requests of the Iranian government to cease
its functioning within Iran, Twitter took affirmative steps to remain
active and usable by the Iranian population. 75 It remains unclear
72 Crisis in Iran Sparks Global Guerilla Cyberwar, FOX NEWS (June 16,
2009), http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,526627,00.html.
7 See id Although this appears to be merely domestic discord being
channeled into online action (which, in and of itself would be a valid area of
concern-the concept of internal cyber civil war between nationals and their
government), the events following the Iranian election also illustrate the extent to
which one nation can subtly utilize cyber warfare tactics against another. See id.
Here, the real cyberbattles were between the Iranian government and dissatisfied
segments of their own population; yet it was the means used to fight those battles
that allowed for passive strategic intervention by other interested nations. See id.
74 See id.
75 Id. In an effort to combat national protest coordination and online
propaganda against the results of the national elections, the Iranian government
began an extensive censorship program of online materials. See id Consequently,
many Twitter users and bloggers outside Iran began to post and tweet information
on how to avoid such censorship and some even changed their own network
settings to mirror those in Iranian settings in an effort to confuse Iranian officials
working to block domestic online postings. Id. Some Twitter users even posted
instructions on how to disable official Iranian government web sites. Id.; see also
Noah Sachtman, Web Attacks Expand in Iran's Cyber Battle (Updated Again),
DANGER RooM, WIRED.COM, (June 16, 2009, 4:06 PM),
http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2009/06/web-attacks-expand-in-irans-cyber-
battle/ (noting that since its inception, and with assistance from international
bloggers and tweeters (specifically those based in the U.S.) (the internal cyber
opposition has begun a full-scale assault on Iranian media outlets as a way to
maintain Iranian opposition communications and disrupt a small amount of official
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whether the decision to remain operable came solely from Twitter, or
if the decision was backed by U.S. government officials..76
Second, in 2010, Iran's two major nuclear power and research
facilities at Bushehr and Natanz were hit with what FOX News called
the "most sophisticated cyberweapon ever created." 7 7 The weapon,
dubbed Stuxnet, operates as a cybermissile equipped with a warhead
designed specifically to penetrate advanced security systems and take
control of general computer system controls.78 Although Iran initially
denied that any attack had taken place, it has since admitted that the
Stuxnet weapon was a massive disruption to the development of its
government web sites. This assault includes systematically targeted DDoS attacks
on numerous Iranian government sites). After a top Iranian crisis tweeter posted
that twitter had become the sole means of internal communications and reporting of
news in Iran, Twitter, recognizing its critical importance to these domestic protests,
went so far as to inconvenience millions of American users and rescheduled an
important network update to allow Twitter to remain active in Iran See Crisis in
Iran Sparks Global Guerilla Cyberwar, supra note 72. Using the Twitter access,
Iranians were ultimately able to maintain internal communications and reporting,
and, as well as posting video clips on the officially blocked You-tube site and kept
the international community informed as to internal Iranian activities. Id.
76 See Crisis in Iran Sparks Global Guerilla Cyberwar, supra note 72. It
was widely reported that Twitter had been contacted by the U.S. State Department,
who asked that they not shut down their systems in Iran. Id. Whether this official
request occurred or not, the facts are quite clear that the U.S. government did not
take any steps to prevent continued Twitter functioning in Iran. See id. As such,
this example displays a more passive form of cyber strategy used by one nation (the
U.S., where Twitter was operating to maintain its functioning capabilities overseas
despite the censorship of the Iranian government) against another. Furthermore, by
not preventing the postings and provision of information to Iranians by private
citizens within the U.S., the U.S. government, again in a purely passive form, may
have been getting exactly what it wanted (namely, to provide the Iranian people
with the tools and knowledge to circumvent and frustrate efforts by the Iranian
government to quell internal domestic discord within their own population).
" Ed Barnes, Stuxnet Worm Still Out of Control at Iran's Nuclear Sites,
Experts Say, FOX News (Dec. 9, 2010),
http://www.foxnews.com/scitech/2010/12/09/despite-iranian-claims-stuxnet-worm-
causing-nuclear-havoc/.
7 See id. In this case, the Stuxnet weapon worked to bypass Iranian cyber
security programs, assume control of critical systems, and evade detection. Id. The
program, a highly specialized and advanced form of malicious programming, took
over the control systems of the centrifuge in the uranium-processing center in
Natanz and disabled the massive nuclear reactor turbine at the Bushehr facility. Id.
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nuclear program. 79 Iran publicly blamed the U.S. and Israel for the
attacks, and has since increased its own efforts to expand the
capabilities of its national cyber warfare operations.80  The Stuxnet
attacks on Iran further evidence the utility of cyber warfare
operations, the growing willingness to use such attacks, and the
'9 See Babak Dehghanpisheh, Going Cyber Against Nuke Program, THE
DAILY BEAST (Oct. 4, 2010),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2010/10/04/stuxnet-worm-latest-attack-
in-growing-cyberwar.html. The damage inflicted by the Stuxnet program has
remained an area of dispute, but Symantec, a major anti-virus software company,
has estimated that over 60,000 Iranian operations computers have been infected. Id.
Further, Ali Akbar Salehi, the head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization, reported
that, as a result of the attack, the nuclear operations at the Bushehr plant have been
delayed at least two months. Id. Others have indicated that the increased assistance
sought by Iran from external software advisors, presumably on how to remove the
Stuxnet worm from their systems, indicates just how much damage has been done.
See Barnes, supra note 77. One leading software advising firm in the U.S. has
reported that since the Stuxnet attacks, Iran has supplanted the U.S. as leading
traffic requesting information on how to eliminate such malicious programs as the
Stuxnet virus. Id. In the end, many commentators have concluded that Iran simply
does not have the technological advancement and capabilities to overcome such a
coordinated and sophisticated cyberattack. Id. Ralph Langer, a German cyber
expert who has studied the effect of Stuxnet in Iran extensively said that Iran,
realistically, would need to "throw out every personal computer involved with the
nuclear program and start over, but they can't do that. Moreover, they are
completely dependent on outside companies for the construction and maintenance
of their nuclear facilities." Id. According to Langer, this lack of technological
knowledge combined with a lack of domestic production of computer technology
may mean that it could be years before Iran's nuclear facilities are functioning
normally again. Id.
so See Barnes, supra note 77. The accusations against the U.S. and Israel
have been largely unverified, although most agree that the scale, sophistication, and
complexity of the Stuxnet attack make it highly likely that a foreign government
with advanced cyberwarfare capabilities created the virus. Id. After the internal,
guerilla-style cyberwarfare that followed the disputed elections in Iran in 2009, Iran
launched the Iranian Cyber Army. Id. Linked with the Revolutionary Guard's
division of the Iranian military forces, this newest branch of the Iranian military
has, according to a Revolutionary Guard spokesman, the goal of "conquer[ing]
virtual space." Id.
8 See id. Analyst Ralph Langer has also addressed the useful advantages
demonstrated by the Stuxnet attack, noting that "[w]e didn't see a full-blown war,
[and] we didn't see fatalities." Id. Further, Langer observes, the attractiveness of
cyberattacks such as Stuxnet are also financial: "Stuxnet may have cost somewhere
between five and 10 million dollars [to create], that's cheap compared to an air
strike or war in the region." Id.
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extreme uncertainty and difficulty in ascertaining the origins of those
attacks. 82
III. CYBER WARFARE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. The Applicability of Current International Laws to Cyber Warfare
At present, international law has yet to fully comprehend the
legal ramifications of cyber warfare. 83  As such, international law
typically only applies to cyber warfare activities by analogy. 84 The
82 Id. While, as Langer points out, the financial benefits of attacks such as
Stuxnet are certainly advantages considered by foreign governments considering
launching cyberattacks abroad, it is likely that the anonymity afforded by such
attacks is the primary draw for foreign governments seeking to inflict mass damage
to other nations' Internet-based infrastructures, essentially without consequence
because they are unable to be verified as the actual source of that attack. See
Opening Up the Stuxnet Worm, CYBERANSWERS (Jan. 6, 2011),
http://cyberanswers.org/?p=617. Security researchers have, in large part, been left
"scratching their heads trying to determine the origin of the Stuxnet worm." Id
Although many, including Roel Schouwenberg, the senior antivirus researcher at
Kaspersky Labs, believe that the sophistication and organization behind both the
Stuxnet worm itself and its targets indicate a high probability of foreign state
government involvement, there is simply no hard evidence to make such a
connection. Id. As a result, foreign governments may be able to deliver catastrophic
attacks on other states' cyberspace infrastructures and computer-based networks
without incriminating themselves.
8 See Scott Shackelford, Estonia Three Years Later: A progress Report on
Combating Cyber Attacks, 13 No. 8 J. INTERNET L. 23, 26 (2010). Much of the
difficulty in establishing an effective legal regime to deal with modem cyber
warfare issues arises from the complexity and constantly evolving nature of the
technology at the heart of cyber warfare, the general inaccessibility (and perhaps
even lack of knowledge of existence altogether) of such technology, and the crucial
lack of consistency in the international community regarding what cyber warfare
really even entails. See Shackelford, supra note 3, at 198-99; see also Schaap,
supra note 22 at 125-27; see generally Sinks, supra note 16, at iii. Consequently,
most commentators' views reflect the essential belief that the current international
legal framework is, at best, severely underdeveloped. See Shackelford, supra at 26.
84 See McGavran, supra note 25, at 269; Shackelford, supra note 3, at 215;
see generally, Duncan B. Hollis, Why States Need an International Law fbr
Information Operations, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 1023, 1037 (2007). Further,
and perhaps more alarmingly, it seems that modern and technologically advanced
states, including the U.S., are not seeking to take much action to modernize
international laws to address the emerging development of cyber warfare (although,
it must be noted that many states, as will be considered later in this comment, have
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most common attempts to analogize cyber warfare to current
international laws have been limited to comparisons between full-
scale cyber warfare and nuclear attacks. 5 Attempts have also been
made to address cyber warfare through analogy to already-existing
international laws and treaties regarding outer space, air space, land,
and the sea.86 However, the analogy between cyber warfare and the
international laws governing air, land, and sea are inadequate in
terms of their nature and applicability. 87 While violations of air, land,
and sea laws may be readily observed and hence prevented,
cyberspace is not restricted by the constraints of the physical world.8
Given the inherent differences between the domains they seek to
regulate, international laws currently applicable to these areas are
simply not a practical way to address the legality of cyber warfare. 89
shown significant drive to legislate at the domestic level to address the growing
capacity for, and use of, weapons of cyber warfare). See McGavran, supra note 25,
at 269.
s Although many commentators have attempted to provide such an
analogy-based argument, one of the most complete is that found in Scott
Shackelford's From Nuclear War to Net War: Analogizing Cyber Attacks in
International Law. See Shackelford, supra note 3, at 217-19. See also Rex
Hughes, Towards a Global Regime for Cyber Warfare, NATO COOPERATIVE
CYBER DEFENSE CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE,
http://www.ccdcoe.org/publications/virtualbattlefield/07_HUGHES%20Cyber%20
Regime.pdf (last visited Dec. 11, 2010). According to Shackelford's analysis, the
worst results of a full-scale cyber warfare attack are comparable only to the
resulting devastation of a full-scale nuclear attack. See Shackelford, supra note 3,
at 215.
a 1 See Shackelford, supra note 3, at 219-27. While Shackelford and others
have also attempted to relate the international legal treatment of other areas, such as
space, air, land, and sea, to cyber warfare, those international laws are based on a
domain so distinct from cyberspace (the sole domain in which cyber warfare
operates) as to render analogies between the two nearly impossible.
8 Analogies relating international laws applicable to air, land, and sea fail
to adequately address the critical problem with cyber warfare: that cyber warfare
ultimately operates in cyberspace, a non-physical domain not subject to
conventional forms of legal regulation and compliance monitoring.
'8 See Sinks, supra note 16, at 6-7. Although cyber warfare necessarily
involves actions occurring across other physical boundaries, or what Sinks calls
other linear domains, international laws applicable to those domains (like air, sea,
and land) simply function on basic assumptions not applicable to cyber warfare.
Id. at 7.
9 Id at 8.
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Outer space, while the closest physical analogy to cyberspace,
remains a purely physical place. 90 Outer space is readily observable,
and hence capable of oversight in a way not possible in the intangible
cyberspace domain.91 International laws limit the use of outer space
for military purposes by not allowing weapons of mass destruction,
particularly nuclear weapons, to be placed in celestial orbit. 92 These
international legal limitations are enforceable because states currently
possess the technology to monitor compliance with such rules and
regulations: if a state attempts to launch a nuclear weapon into orbit,
it would be practically impossible to hide this act from the
international community. Yet, in cyberspace, actions are not subject
to such readily observable simplicity. Indeed, as we have seen in the
cyber attacks on Estonia, it is the effects of cyber warfare, not its
actual implementation, which remain visible to the international
world. Although there are convincing scientific arguments relating
cyberspace to outer space, 93 the principal difference between them-
the fact that cyberspace is initiated and results in tangible world
effects, while outer space operates at all times in a purely physical,
and hence physically observable, world-renders legal application
through analogy between the two both impractical and inefficient. In
considering international legal restrictions on outer space and
cyberspace, the fact remains that a differing basis lies at the heart of
each domain. As such, cyberspace must be subject to regulation from
90 See Outer space, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Outer-space
(last visited Jan. 5, 2010). Although generally defined as a void, outer space is not
empty; it contains low densities of physically observable particles. Id.
91 As Shackelford notes, outer space international law does not permit
sovereignty claims in space. See Shackelford, supra note 3, at 219.
92 See id
93 See Rebecca Bryant, What Kind of Space is Cyberspace?, MINERVA - AN
INTERNET JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, VOL. 5, 2001,
http://www.ul.ie/-philos/vol5/cyberspace.html (last visited Nov. 29, 2010). Bryant
argues that cyberspace and outer space are intimately connected in that they share
four primary components that define their existence; namely, each is fundamentally
structured around place, distance, size, and route. Id. However, despite these
theoretical similarities, she concludes that cyberspace cannot be subsumed under a
theory of physical space. Id. Bryant notes that although cyberspace is intimately
connected to the physical world (insofar as cyberspace depends on computer and
network structures created and operating within the physical world), it is this
intimate connection between the two that also leads to their most basic difference:
"physical space, if it exists, depends on nothing at all." Id.
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a legal paradigm that accounts for and addresses this ultimate
difference. 94
Meanwhile, analogies between nuclear war and cyber warfare
remain, in large part, based upon the similarity in the real world,
tangible consequences of each type of warfare. 95 However, the fact
that nuclear and cyber warfare have similar consequences in terms of
damages and injury does not inexorably lead to the subsequent
conclusion that the international laws applicable to nuclear war
should also be applied to cyber warfare. 96 In fact, the general
ambiguity and uncertainty surrounding the international legality of
nuclear warfare seems to suggest the exact opposite; namely, that the
existing international legal paradigm is completely inadequate to
effectively deal with key issues inherently raised by cyber warfare. 97
94 It seems that the obvious problem is that no other domain addressed by
any legal paradigm will possibly be able to account for this distinction between the
physical world and cyberspace, and indeed, this is true. Consequently, as this
Comment will conclude, cyber warfare requires a completely new and
revolutionary legal approach, hence rendering all attempts at legal analogy
inadequate. See infra notes 162, 211, 238 (commentators views that a new
international legal paradigm may be required to address the legal issues created by
cyber warfare operations).
9 See Shackelford, supra note 3, at 216. He argues that the kinetic effects
of a large-scale cyber warfare attack can be understood only with reference to the
historically observable effects of nuclear weaponry and "[a]n all-out [cyber
warfare] attack could disable or destroy all critical infrastructures, leave the victim
nation completely helpless and terrorize its population." Id. at 218. Furthermore,
Shackelford argues that cyber warfare and nuclear war similarly do not
discriminate between civilians and combatants, and their use is almost inevitably
guaranteed to result in some degree of collateral damage. Id. at 217-18.
96 See Hearing for the Future of Cyber Attack Attribution: Before the H.
Science and Technology Subcomm. on Technology & Innovation, 110th Cong.
Sess. 1 (2010). In this Congressional Hearing, the ramifications of full-scale cyber
warfare were distinguished from nuclear war in that while the use of nuclear
weapons is prevented by the mutually-assured destruction and deterrence factors,
these do not apply in regulation of cyber warfare. Id.
97 See Shackelford, supra note 3, at 216. While Shackelford is correct to
point out that cyber warfare is a concept not specifically addressed by international
law (on either a treaty or customary basis), that fact is not a legitimate reason for
treating cyber warfare and nuclear war as analogous under international law. As
Shackelford admits, the current international law legal regime is, to this day,
ambiguous regarding the use of nuclear weapons. Id. at 217-18. The fact remains
that, more than half a century after their first emergence, nuclear weapons continue
to hold an unclear status under international law. See id, at 217. The fact that
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In the end, the analogy is inadequate by its very nature.9 As such,
these attempts to address perhaps the greatest threat to international
security since the development of the atomic bomb9 9 require more
consideration in order to be truly effective. 0o
nuclear weapons remain an unclear concept under international law after such a
long time seems to indicate that the international legal community's approach to
nuclear weapons has proven to be utterly inadequate. Since their international
introduction in 1945 and their first and only wartime uses during World War II,
nuclear weapons have perplexed international legal scholars. See id. at 217-18.
Shackelford notes that the International Court of Justice [ICJ] did attempt to
address the international legality of nuclear weapons in the 1996 Legality of
Nuclear Weapons case, but the opinion was muddled at best. Id. The case resulted
in an even split (7-7) amongst the court justices and was ultimately decided by the
President's tie breaking vote. See Commander Robert Green, Judgment Day at
World Court: Nuclear Weapons States Brought to Book,
http://www.cs.umbc.edu/~nicholas/676/files/197.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2011).
This case indicated that although the use of nuclear weapons would generally be
contrary to international law, the court was unable to determine whether nuclear
weapons may be permissible in cases of extreme self-defense where the very
existence of a state is in jeopardy. Id. Ultimately, the inability of international law
to adequately define the status of nuclear weapons is not a legitimate reason for
seeking to analogize them to cyber warfare. If anything, international law and its
inability to deal with nuclear weapons indicates that new international legal
strategies need to be employed when dealing with cyber warfare to avoid the same
legal ambiguity that remains such a problem with nuclear warfare.
98 See infra notes 158-60 (discussing the specific problems with seeking to
use analogy as a legal tool).
99 See Paul Woodward, Stuxnet: The Trinity Test of Cyber warfare, WAR IN
CONTEXT (Sept. 23, 2010), http://warincontext.org/2010/09/23/stuxnet-the-trinity-
test-of-cyberwarfare/. Woodard believes that the recent Stuxnet attacks in Iran
were the first major cyber warfare action taken on an international level between
states. Id. He further states that this attack is as critical as the first nuclear weapons
test conducted by the United States, code-named "Trinity," although he ultimately
believes that it is more likely that Israel, and not the United States, was directly
responsible for the attack. Id. Woodward calls Stuxnet a "cyber missile" and
implies that the damage caused by such a weapon could trigger "Chernobyl-like
catastrophe, or the entire destruction of [a nation's] conventional energy grid." Id
Further, Woodward notes that many feel that the relationship between the Stuxnet
cyber weapon and nuclear weapons extends further to the basic mechanisms by
which each devastating weapon self-regulates and prohibits its use; namely,
through deterrence. Id. However, Woodward instead views Stuxnet as indicative of
a show of global strength by Israel (who Woodward believes is ultimately behind
the attack) both of their advanced cyber warfare capabilities and, critically, their
willingness to utilize such capabilities. Id. Woodward finally believes that the
weapons of cyberwarfare are even more problematic than nuclear weapons because
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In the past decade, attempts to legally regulate cyber warfare
operations have become increasingly common as individual nations
recognize both the undeniable proliferation of cyber warfare
technology and the immediacy of the threat posed by such
proliferation.'o' There have been numerous domestic attempts to
address various aspects of cyber warfare within prominent states
functioning as global leaders in cyber warfare development and
technology. 102
Within the U.S., domestic responses to cyber warfare threats
have been steadily increasing since the mid-1990s and Department of
Defense funding for cyber warfare related intelligence nearly doubled
from 1998 to 2001.103 The origins of the U.S. cyber warfare
regulation began as far back as 1988 when the government formed
of their ease of proliferation and use amongst several state and private actors. Id.;
see generally Sir Robert Fry, Fighting Wars in Cyberspace, WALL STREET J. (July
21, 2010),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703724104575379343636553602.
html. Fry, a former Deputy Commanding General of coalition forces in Iraq and
currently chairman of a business consultancy, believes that cyber warfare is, on the
whole, an even greater threat to global security than nuclear weapons. Id. He notes
that cyber warfare, much like nuclear weapons, is ultimately capable of causing
"instantaneous failure of the systems that animate and sustain modem life . .. [a]t a
stroke, computer systems, power grids, industrial production and financial markets
could fail, with untold consequences for civil governance and social cohesion: an
electronic Pearl Harbor and all without a conventional shot being fired." Id Such a
devastating cyber warfare attack is not "academic hypothesis," Fry warns, but a
very real possibility, especially given the ease with which cyber weaponry can
proliferate. Id. Ultimately, Fry concludes, "[c]yber operations are the next weapons
of mass effect, or, as more than one wag has put it, 'weapons of mass disruption.'
Whereas nuclear weapons have been used twice in human history, cyber weapons
are employed daily." Id.
100 See Fry, supra note 99. Although Fry does concede that cyber warfare
may, similarly to nuclear proliferation and use, remain subject to principles of
deterrence, he ultimately believes that this form of self-regulation is inadequate. Id.
In order to address the novel and devastating potential of cyber warfare, Fry
concludes, there is "an existential need to create some form of regulatory system
that allows more than implicit deterrence. This will not be easy." Id.
1'0 See McGavran, supra note 25, at 268-69.
102 See Shackelford, supra note 83, at 23.
103 See generally Anthony H. Cordesman, Defending America - Redefining
the Conceptual Borders of Homeland Defense: Terrorism, Asymmetric Warfare,
And Nuclear Weapons, CSIS PUBLICATIONS (Feb. 14, 2001),
http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/terrorasymw&nucl.pdf.
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the first cyber emergency response team ("CERT") at Carnegie
Mellon University. 10 4 CERT was formed in response to a growing
number of cyber based attacks on government networks and
computer infrastructures.105 In its first year of operation, CERT
investigated six cases of computer security invasions. 106 Presently,
the successor to CERT, the U.S. Cyber Emergency Response Team
("USCERT") operates as a department of Homeland Security and
handles well over 50,000 such investigations annually.' 07 The U.S.
Air Force took over much of the nations' cyber warfare operations in
2005, and the Air Force mission statement was even altered to reflect
the addition of cyberspace as an Air Force battlefield.os In 2009, the
U.S. launched the next phase of its cyber defense scheme, the U.S.
Cyber Command (CYBERCOM), which was created to unify various
government departments and agencies dealing with national cyber
warfare strategy.' 09  Subsequently, President Obama appointed a
permanent cyber czar to deal with national cyber warfare policies on
a more cohesive scale.110 However, many feel that this newly created
post remains heavy on responsibility but fairly light in terms of actual
authority." Most recently, U.S. Senator Joe Lieberman introduced a
piece of cyber security legislation that would grant the President
broad powers of control over the national Internet infrastructure in
104 See Shackelford, supra note 83, at 23.
10 See id.
106 See id.
107 See About Us, United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team
(US-CERT), http://www.us-cert.gov/aboutus.html (last visited Dec. 12, 2010). See
also Howard F. Lipson, Tracking and Tracing Cyber-Attacks: Technical
Challenges and Global Policy Issues, CERT COORDINATION CENTER 5 (Nov.
2002), http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA408853&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf.
108 See Staff Sgt. C. Todd Lopez, Cyber Summit begins at Pentagon Nov.
16, AIR FORCE PRINT NEWS (Nov. 15, 2006),
http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id= 123032005.
109 See U.S. Cyber Command Factsheet, UNITED STATES STRATEGIC
COMMAND, http://www.stratcom.mil/factsheets/CyberCommand (last visited Jan.
14, 2010).
110 See Ellen Nakashima, Obama to name Howard Schmidt as cybersecurity
coordinator, WASH. POST (Dec. 22, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/12/2 1/AR2009122103055.html).
"n See id.
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cases of cyber attack emergencies.112 Although various privacy
concerns regarding the proposed bill have been raised, such proposals
evidence the increasing willingness of domestic legislatures to
directly address cyber warfare issues within their domain.' 13 Finally,
in July of 2010, the U.S. House of Representatives held a hearing to
consider the implications of cyber warfare in terms of state
attribution and the potential role of deterrence in preventing cyber
warfare. 114
The U.S. is not the only global power to recently address cyber
warfare issues on a domestic scale. In China, cyber warfare has been
a primary military concern and goal for several years. As far back as
1999 the PLA Daily, the official media outlet of the People's
Liberation Army of China, reported, "[i]nternet warfare is of equal
significance to land, sea, and air power and requires its own military
branch."' 15 Reports by various U.S. intelligence agencies have
likewise concluded that the Chinese military is both expanding its
cyber warfare capabilities and simultaneously exploring offensive
cyber warfare strategies and weaponry." 6 Over the years, there have
been several claims that China has attacked U.S. based targets via
cyber warfare weaponry, although the vast majority remain
12 See PROTECTING CYBERSPACE AS A NATIONAL ASSET ACT OF 2010, S.
3480, 111TH CONG. (2010), available at http://www.opencongress.org/bill/111-
s3480/text. See also Donny Shaw, Lieberman Cybersecurity Bill Would Give DHS
Broad Emergency Powers Over the Internet, OPENCONGRESS BLOG (June 14,
2010), http://www.opencongress.org/articles/view/1917-Lieberman-Cybersecurity-
Bill-Would-Give-DHS-Broad-Emergency-Powers-Over-the-Intemet..
113 See Protecting Cyberspace as a National Asset Act of 2010, supra note
112; see also Shaw, supra note 112.
114 See Hearing on Planning for the Future of Cyber Attack Attribution:
Before the H. Sci. and Tech. Subcomm. on Tech. and Innovation, 110th Cong. Sess.
1 (July 15, 2010), available at http://science.house.gov/hearing/subcommittee-
technology-and-innovation-hearing-cyber-attack-attribution.
115 See Kevin B. Alexander, Warfighting in Cyberspace, JOINT FORCES Q.,
July 31, 2007, at 58-59, available at
http://www.military.con/forums/0,15240,143898,00.html. See also Schaap, supra
note 22, at 132-33.
116 See U.S. DEPT. OF DEF. ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: MLITARY
POWER OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 21 (2007), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/070523-China-Military-Power-final.pdf;
Kevin Coleman, China 's Cyber Forces, DEFENSE TECH.ORG (May 8, 2008),
http://defensetech.org/2008/05/08/chinas-cyber-forces/#more-283 1.
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unconfirmed, and China has denied any responsibility for such
attacks. "7
Additionally, Russia has established itself as a leader in cyber
warfare technology, and has become dedicated to utilizing cyber
warfare strategy to increase the effectiveness of more traditional
forms of military prowess. 18 Russia, like China, has been accused of
involvement in several global instances of cyber attacks, but they
have denied any such actions and no definitive proof of their
participation has been established.1 19 Russia's domestic approach to
cyber warfare has been split between several government and
military agencies seeking to protect critical Russian cyberspace
infrastructure while concurrently developing offensive cyber warfare
strategies to attack the vulnerable infrastructures of enemies of the
State.120 Despite these various domestic efforts, the concept of cyber
warfare generally is, by its nature, a global issue that may only be
effectively addressed at the international level.121
Global responses to cyber warfare remain in their infancy; yet,
there has been an increasing trend amongst international
organizations to address this growing issue.122 In particular, three
117 See Siobhan Gorman, Electricity Grid in US Penetrated by Spies, WALL
STREET J. (Apr. 8, 2009),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123914805204099085.html.
" See Kevin Coleman, Russia 's Cyber Forces, DEFENSETECH.ORG (May
27, 2008), http://www.defensetech.org/archives/catcyberwarfare.html; see also
Schaap, supra note 22, at 133.
119 See Shackelford, supra note 83, at 24-5.
120 See Timothy L.I. Thomas, Russia's Information Warfare Structure:
Understanding the Roles of the Security Council, Fapsi, the State Technical
Commission and the Military, 7 EUR. SEC. 156 (Spring 1998), available at
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09662839808407354#preview; see
also Shackelford, supra note 83, at 25.
121 Warfare, in its most basic global understanding, is defined as "a contest
between two or more independent nations [sic] carried on by authority of their
respective governments." War, THE 'LECTRIC LAW LIBRARY,
http://www.lectlaw.com/def2/w038.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 2010). Although
domestic consideration of cyber warfare issues is important, international law
requires a more globally applicable approach to cyber warfare to which the entire
global community can derive an understanding of cyber warfare's legality and
limitations.
122 See Shackelford, supra note 3, at 243-44; see also Malawer, supra note
13, at 28.
31-2
international agencies have officially addressed cyber warfare, to
varying degrees, over the past few years. 123
First, in 2001, the European Union (EU) sought to address the
growing problems of cyberspace crimes and illegal Internet activities
through the EU Council Convention on Cybercrime.124 Although
created under the initiative of the European Union, the convention in
Budapest, which resulted in the extensive Cybercrime treaty, was
signed by forty-one nations, including the U.S., Canada, and
Japan. 125 Not only was this treaty the first international agreement
directly addressing cyberspace-related global legal issues, but it
specifically stressed the importance of reconciling domestic policies
and establishing a globally unified regime of international
cooperation to deal with cyberspace crimes. 126 However, the EU
Convention does not apply to cyber warfare, and, in fact, its criminal
liability for cyberspace crimes specifically does not extend to actions
undertaken in accordance with lawful government authority. 27
Although the primary aim of the EU Convention on Cybercrime is
criminal activity online, and not cyber warfare, it nonetheless
remains a valuable indication of the willingness of the world's global
powers to cooperate in modifying and expanding the application of
international law to issues of legal regulation in cyberspace.12 8 It
remains critically important that global nations and organizations
such as the EU and U.S. start to work together to address issues
123 See Shackelford, supra note 3, at 243-44; see also Malawer, supra note
13, at 28.
124 See Council of Europe, Convention on Cybercrime, Additional Protocol/
Explanatory Reports, Nov, 23, 2001, C.E.T.S 185, available at
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/html/185.htm.
125 See Ira Piltz, Internet law- European Union's Convention on Cyber
crime (ets no. 185):Cybercrime: First International Treaty on Crimes Committed
via the Internet, COMPUTER CRIME RESEARCH CENTER (Jan. 22, 2008),
http://www.crime-research.org/news/22.01.2008/3144/.
126 See id.; Tom Espiner, US joins European cybercrime convention,
ZDNET UK BLOG (Oct. 2, 2006, 1:30 PM), http://www.zdnet.co.uk/news/security-
management/2006/10/02/us-joins-european-cybercrime-convention-39283761/.
127 See Schaap, supra note 22, at 171-72.
128 See Alain Megias, European Union Policies Regarding Cybercrime,
INTERNET BUSINESS LAW SERVICES (Jan. 22, 2011), http://www.i-
policy.org/20 11/01/european-union-policies-regarding-cybercrime.html.
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which deal with the cyberspace domain and which have not, up to
this point, been explicitly addressed by international laws.' 29 The
formation of such treaty agreements not only creates binding
international legal obligations upon signatory states, but if acceded to
by enough of the global community, could also become binding
customary international law.130
Second, in 2002 and again in 2007, the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) held summits in which the implications of
cyber warfare were a primary concern.13 ' In 2002, NATO held a
summit in Prague where it first began to consider the importance of
cyber defense.132 Although the Prague summit began NATO
discussions of cyber warfare and its potential impact on the global
community, it was after the 2007 cyber attack on Estonia that the
need to expand on the 2002 summit became readily apparent.133 After
numerous cyber attacks crippled their electronic infrastructures,
Estonia, a NATO member, officially requested NATO assistance in
defense of its digital assets.' 34 NATO responded by sending cyber
specialists to Estonia, but did not accomplish much in terms of aiding
Estonia or regulating the Internet-based weapons being used against
them.135 Ultimately, some have concluded that the NATO response,
or lack thereof, "illustrated the lack of a coherent NATO cyber
doctrine and strategy."l 36 Following the attacks on Estonia, NATO
held another summit, this time in Bucharest a year later, to reconsider
the growing problem of cyber warfare. 137 The Bucharest summit
dealt with how the alliance should specifically respond to cyber
129 d
130 See DAVID HARRIS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW
3 8-40 (Sweet and Maxwell, 7th ed. 1998).
131 See Defending against cyber attacks, NATO/OTAN (Jun. 24, 2011),
http://www.nato.int/issues/cyberdefence/index.html.
132 Id
133 See Shackelford, supra note 83, at 25-26.
134 See Rex B. Hughes, NA TO and Cyber Defense: Mission Accomplished?,
NATO/OTAN (Apr. 2009),
http://www.carlisle.army.mil/DIME/documents/NATO%20and%20Cyber
%20Defence.pdf.
135 See Shackelford, supra note 83, at 25.
136 See id.; Hughes, supra note 134, at 10-11.
137 See Shackelford, supra note 83, at 25.
warfare and § 47 of the Bucharest Summit Declaration stated,
"NATO remains committed to strengthening key alliance information
systems against cyber attacks." 3 8
As a result of this summit, NATO developed a Cooperative
Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence in Tallinn, Estonia to address
defending against and countering advanced cyber attacks.' 3 9 Also,
the Bucharest summit resulted in the creation of the Cyber Defense
Management Authority in Brussels.1 40 This authority represents a
centralized NATO cyber defense strategy and seeks to merge
national and private sector cyber defense elements.141 The essential
NATO cyber warfare defense strategy remains under the control of
the North Atlantic Council and, at present, it seems that cyber
warfare would only activate NATO treaty Article 4, requiring NATO
members to consult one another to determine a response to a cyber
attack against NATO members.142 This also means that Article 5 of
the NATO treaty would not be applicable to instances of cyber attack
against a NATO member; hence, other NATO treaty nations would
not be required under the treaty obligations to assist the attacked
nation in combating against such cyber warfare.143  Thus, although
NATO has begun to concretely address the issues raised by the
increasing threat of cyber warfare, several additional steps are still
required before NATO can sufficiently deal with countering and
" See Bucharest Summit Declaration, Section 47, North Atlantic Treaty
Organization, April 3, 2008, available at
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/officialtexts_8443.htm.
139 See Shackelford, supra note 83, at 25; see also NATO Opens New
Centre of Excellence on Cyber Defense, NATO NEWS (May 20, 2008),
http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2008/05-may/e0514a.html.140 See Ian Grant, NATO Sets Up Cyber Defense Management Authority in
Brussels, ComputerWeekly.com BLOG (Apr. 4, 2008, 4:22pm),
http://www.computerweekly.com/Articles/2008/04/04/230143/nato-sets-up-cyber-
defense-management-authority-in-brussels.htm.
141 See id. See also Shackelford, supra note 83, at 25.
142 See Grant, supra note 140; see also Shackelford, supra note 83, at 25.
See also Defending against cyber attacks, NATO NEWS (Jan. 29, 2009),
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49193.htm.
143 See NATO agrees on common approach to cyber defense,
EURACTIV.COM (Apr. 4, 2008), http://www.euractiv.com/infosociety/nato-agrees-
common-approach-cyber-defence/article-171377.
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addressing cyber warfare.14 4 Furthermore, although NATO policy
may be unofficially indicative of the stance of a large portion of the
international community, it does not ultimately reflect general
international law. Hence, even if NATO were to explicitly address
cyber warfare activities, it is doubtful that such organizational
doctrine would evince international law on that subject. 145
Finally, just last year, the U.N. began to take a definite, albeit
unofficial, recognition of the pressing concerns associated with cyber
warfare proliferation. 14 6 While the official U.N. policy regarding
cyber warfare remains unclear, most commentators maintain that
cyber warfare may be somewhat susceptible to treatment under
established U.N. Charter provisions, and there has been an increasing
tendency for individual agencies and high-level U.N. officials to
voice their concerns with the growing cyber warfare issue. 147 In
January of last year, the U.N. International Telecommunications
Union Secretary General, Hamadoun Tour6, spoke at the World
Economic Forum debate, noting that "cyber war would be worse than
a tsunami-a catastrophe." 48 Tour6 then proposed that an
international treaty should be formed to prevent the outbreak of such
a war.149 The treaty should, according to Tour6, center around a
global agreement that nations would not utilize cyber warfare as a
first strike weapon. 50 Others, such as former director of US
intelligence John Negroponte, have expressed severe reservations
regarding the creation of such a cyber warfare treaty.15 Still others
have called for a global alliance or agency to address the issues of
cyber warfare, including Microsoft chief research and strategy officer
Craig Mundie, who has advocated for the creation of a World Heath
'" See Shackelford, supra note 83, at 25.
145 See id.
146 See AFP, UN Chief Calls for Treaty to Prevent Cyber War, GOOGLE
NEWS (Jan. 30, 2010),
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5h8Uvk-jpSvCWT-
bqYSglWs4I4yAA.
147 See id
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 Id.
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Organization for the Internet. 152 Mundie went so far as to suggest that
a "driver's license" for Internet users may be a useful step towards
securing the cyberspace domain and preventing illegal and
destructive online incidents.153
While the recent statements from Tour6 have not been
confirmed as indicative of any official U.N. policy or stance, they are
nonetheless compelling evidence that the U.N. has begun to consider
cyber warfare as a legitimate global issue worthy of consideration. In
the meantime, it seems that the current U.N. Charter provisions might
continue to be imperfectly applied to some instances of cyber
warfare. 15 4 In fact, Walter Gary Sharp, the editor of the United
Nations Peace Operations, recently stated in his book, Cyberspace
and the Use of Force, that traditional international law explicitly
covers cyber warfare.15 1 Sharp concluded that cyber warfare
activities fall within the armed attack category, and hence should
remain subject to customary international law and U.N. Charter
provisions dealing with such use of illegal force. 156
While these attempts to address the international legality of
cyber warfare are a positive step in the right direction, they remain
fundamentally flawed in that each attempt ultimately operates within
152 Id.
153 Id. See also Brian D. Hill, UN agency calls for global cyber warfare
treaty, 'driver's license'for Web users, U.S.W.G.O. (Feb. 1, 2010), uswgo.com/un-
agency-calls-for-global-cyberwarfare-treaty-drivers-license-for-web-users.htm.
154 See, e.g., Shackelford, supra note 3, at 244-47 (arguing that U.N.
resolutions and the U.N. Charter generally may remain applicable to some
instances of cyber warfare); Dondi S. West, A Survey and Examination of the
Adequacy of the Laws Related to Cyber Warfare,
https://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-18/dc-18-presentations/West/DEFCON-18-
West-Laws-Cyber-Warfare-WP.pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2010) (a presentation
arguing that the current rules of international law, embodied within the U.N.
Charter, are sufficient to address the emerging issues of cyber warfare); Schaap,
supra note 22, at 148-50 (arguing that customary international laws of war,
combined with the U.N. Charter provisions on "use of force," may apply to cyber
warfare).
155 WALTER GARY SHARP, SR., CYBERSPACE AND THE USE OF FORCE 234-
35 (Aegis Research Corp. 1999).
1s6 Id; see also Sinks, supra note 16, at 22-23.
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the confines of an international legal structure that is ill-equipped to
deal with the advanced issues raised by questions of cyber warfare. 5 7
In the end, the proposed use of analogy to govern the legality
of cyber warfare is a problematic proposition at best and, at worst, a
very dangerous suggestion.' 5 1 While the use of analogy has remained
157 Despite the inadequacy of the current global attempts of the
international community to address issues of cyber warfare legality, as this
comment argues, the fact nonetheless remains that attempts such as those
mentioned in this section do evidence the fact that key international organizations
are treating these cyber warfare issues as a present concern. As U.S. General
Wesley Clark recently warned, cyber warfare is such an irregular and unfamiliar
form of military attack that it may be "tempting for policymakers to view cyber
warfare as an abstract future threat." Wesley K. Clark & Peter L. Levin, Securing
the Information Highwa': How to Enhance the United States' Electronic Defenses,
Foreign Affairs, Nov.-Dec. 2009, at 2. Nonetheless, as will be argued in this
comment in more detail in the subsequent sections, the fact remains that global
leaders considering the legality of cyber warfare must also recognize that the
existing international law paradigm is inherently inadequate to address cyber
warfare because it remains based on presumptions that simply do not hold true for
the unique area of cyber warfare operations. See Amit, supra note 24, at 7 (noting
that it is obvious that conventional understandings of combat and battlefield simply
do not pertain to considerations of cyber warfare).
"5 The concept of analogy generally has always been a problematic idea.
Since its first use by the Greeks in mathematical formulations, the concept of
analogy has been thought of primarily as a cognitive function used for transferring
a meaning from one subject to another target subject. See Analogy, WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Analogy (last visited Dec. 10, 2010). By its nature,
analogy is merely a comparison of two dissimilar things; it is a cognitive tool
designed to relate two objects in a way that our minds can adequately comprehend.
Id. The value of analogy, however, has been questioned since its first use; great
philosophers such as Plato, though using analogy in many of their discourses,
continually warned against its inherent inadequacy. Amelie Frost Benedikt,
Runaway Statues: Platonic Lessons on the Limits of an Analogy, PAIDEIA PROJECT
ON-LINE, http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Anci/AnciBene.htm (last visited Oct. 10,
2010). Plato used analogy in nearly all of his famous dialogues; it was in the Meno
that Plato both utilized and distanced himself from his interlocutor's use of analogy
to understand the relationship between knowledge and opinion. Id. Although Plato
recognized that analogy is a useful and indispensable tool in philosophic discourse,
he simultaneously understood that analogy remains limited in its ability and
practical usefulness, and so reminded his readers not to overzealously follow or
apply the concept. Id. In the end, the use of analogy, in any context, remains a
difficult thing; as Plato observed rightly so long ago, we must be wise in
understanding when it applies, when it does not, and to what degree its
applicability should be accepted.
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a commonly accepted form of judicial reasoning,15 9 it is ultimately
little more than a self-regulating legal tool used to resolve disputes
for which no actual, independent rules of law have formed.160
Furthermore, global attempts to operate within the framework of
existing international law have proven insufficient in addressing the
legality of cyber warfare.' 6 1 Instead of futilely attempting to
analogize the current international legal paradigm to accommodate
cyber warfare, a more active role needs to be adopted by the
international community.162 The critical first step in taking such a
proactive approach to establishing the international legality of cyber
warfare must be the formation of a definite understanding of the most
fundamental legal issues raised by the emergence of cyber warfare.163
Only by identifying and understanding the inability of current
159 See GIORGIO DEL VECCHIO, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW 12 (1986).
160 Id. at 14-15. As del Vecchio notes, analogy, in its legal use, remains
limited insofar as it only applies when there is substantial similarity between the
instant case and the cases to which the legal rule of law being analogized applies.
Id. at 15. Ultimately, he concludes, the law has regulated the use of analogy
because, as a general matter of law and of logic, jurisprudence has come to realize
that despite the value of analogies in solving cases, the simple fact remains that
often analogy alone remains insufficient to actually solve the instant case. Id. at 14.
161 See Steven A. Hildreth, Cyberwarfare, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RL30735 9 (June 19, 2001), available at
http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=A
DA398642. Hildreth concludes that, given the pervasive uncertainty associated
with attempting to define cyber warfare operations within the present international
law paradigm, "there is little likelihood that the international community will soon
generate a coherent body of information operations law." Id.
162 See Shackelford, supra note 3, at 246. Although the basis of
Shackelford's article is the analogizing of current international laws and treaties to
cyber warfare operations, even he ultimately concedes that these analogies are not a
"panacea" for the numerous and complex issues associated with the emergence of
cyber warfare. Id. In the end, Shackelford recognizes that cyber warfare ultimately
will require the "creation of a [new] legal regime" to deal explicitly with cyber
warfare. Id. It is exactly the creation of such a newly formed international legal
paradigm, specifically addressing the three primary problems with the former
international law regime, which constitutes the final part of this comment.
6 Id. See also Kanuck, supra note 26, at 286-87. As Kanuck observes,
cyber warfare has done more than merely alter our perceptions of what constitutes
military activity and armed attack; it has fundamentally and forever altered and
redefined the battlefield in which military operations occur. Id. Consequently,
international laws applicable to such military activities need not be based on our
prior conceptions of what limitations defined that battlefield. Id.
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international law to deal with cyber warfare can the global
community begin to formulate new and effective legal solutions to
effectively address the revolutionary legal issues posed by cyber
warfare. 164
B. Inadequacies of Current International Laws
Presently, international law is unable to deal with three key
legal issues raised by cyber warfare: the problems of attribution,
jurisdiction, and "use of force." These paramount considerations are
problematic in the cyber warfare context because they make clear the
fundamental flaw in attempting to apply current international law to
cyber warfare: international law naturally assumes it can be made
applicable to any type of military strategy, however, the reality is that
cyber warfare cannot be adequately addressed by the existing
paradigm and structure of international law.1 6 5
1. Attribution Problem
The most commonly identified challenge that cyber warfare
poses for the present international legal regime is the concept of
attribution.166 The concept of attribution-the question of whose acts
are attributable to a sovereign national State-is a critical question in
164 d. at 287-88.
165 See id. at 283. The idea that the presently existing international legal
regime is inherently insufficient to cope with issues raised by modernized cyber
warfare operations has been argued to be based solely on the fact that cyber warfare
operations involve the melding of military target and military information into one
entity. Id. This argument is simply stating that international law is predicated on the
belief that such law addresses the means of military strategy employed by global
powers; when, as in cyber warfare, the means employed and the ends sought are the
same (namely the destruction of information), the traditional concept of war
becomes inapplicable, and international law ceases to be of any real value. Id.
166 Sean M. Condron, Getting it Right: Protecting American Critical
Infrastructure in Cyberspace, 20 HARV. L.J. & TECH. 403, 414 (2007); see also
Shackelford, supra note 3, at 233; Steven Fox, Cyber Warfare and Attribution,
CSO (July 16, 2009, 9:03 PM),
http://blogs.csoonline.com/cyber-warfare-andattribution; Kevin Coleman, The
Challenge of Attribution in Cyber War, Bring on the Lawyers, DEFENSE TECH
(Sept. 7, 2010), http://defensetech.org/2010/09/07/the-challenge-of-attribution-in-
cyber-war/; Sinks, supra note 16, at 2.
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present international law for two reasons. First, identifying the source
of an attack allows the victim to make an appropriate response
against that party without threatening innocent collateral damage, and
second, the right of reprisal and self-defense of a State that is the
victim of a cyber attack largely depend on whether the identity of the
attacker can be definitively determined.167
The recent events surrounding the controversial 2009 Iranian
elections, discussed earlier in this comment, provide a better context
for considering the real world problems of attribution in cyber
warfare operations.168 According to Matthew Burton, a former U.S.
intelligence analyst who has since joined those providing valuable
cyber knowledge to the Iranian opposition, "[we have] turned our
collective power and outrage into a serious weapon that we could use
at our will . . . [w]e practiced distributed, citizen-based warfare."l 69
Are the actions of national citizens online, in efforts to assist
foreigners rebelling against their local governments, attributable to
the nation in which those providing the assistance reside? 70 Are the
actions attributable to the nation in which those providing assistance
are maintaining their computer operations and server information?
Are the actions attributable to all the nations through which those
167 See Condron, supra note 166, at 414.
'68 Noah Shachtman, Web Attacks Expand in Iran's Cyber Battle, WIRED
(June 16, 2009, 4:06 PM), http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/tag/media-war/. See
supra notes 75-76 (detailing the potential involvement of other States, and the
documented involvement of private parties operating outside Iran, in the internal
cyber battles between the Iranian government and local factions who remained
dissatisfied with the national elections); see also supra note 70.
169 Crisis in Iran Sparks Global Guerilla Cyberwar, supra note 72.
170 See id. In the Iranian elections scenario, private individuals and bloggers
from across the globe posted information to assist elements within Iran to dodge
censorship. Id. Other international bloggers have sought to assist local Iranians
opposed to the recent elections by altering their server location in order to interfere
with local Iranian attempts to subdue online propaganda within Iran; there has even
been a report that one American blogger posted instructions on how to disable
official Iranian websites. Id. Would such acts by a party operating within the U.S.
be attributable to the U.S. government? If it were, severe implications would arise
for both Iran - which would likely hold the U.S. government directly responsible
for such acts as, at the very least, attempts to disrupt internal order and, at worst,
acts of war - and the U.S. - who would likely, in order to avoid Iranian reprisals
and international sanctions, need to strictly regulate private citizen access to the
Internet and ability to post such materials.
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providing the assistance need to have their cyberspace information
travel? These are the complex, and often dizzying, questions and
issues related to the relationship between cyber warfare operations
and State attribution that require consideration from an legal regime.
Traditionally, attribution under the present international law
regime is subsumed into the more generalized category of state
responsibility."' According to the International Law Commission
(ILC) Draft Articles on State Responsibility, the actions of a non-
state organization may be attributed to the State in a variety of
circumstances.1 72 However, it is the concept of attribution established
under Article 8 of the ILC Draft Articles that poses the most critical
consideration for cyber warfare operations by private individuals.1 73
Under this article, a State may be held liable for the cyber warfare
activities of private individuals and organizations if it can be shown
that the person or persons were acting on behalf of the State
1' See generally Harris, supra note 130, at 484. Within this large area of
state responsibility, Harris considers whether the actions of individuals and non-
government agencies and organizations are attributable to the state government
(and hence that state government can be held internationally accountable for the
consequences of those actions, under international law, as though the acts were
their own) in terms of what he calls "imputability." Id. at 499.
172 Id. Under Article 5 of the ILC Draft Articles, the conduct of any state
organ, having that status under internal, domestic law, shall entail responsibility of
the state generally if they are acting within their capacity as such at the time of the
action in question. Id. Further, under Article 6, a state organ's acts will be
attributable to the state regardless of what area of the state it is involved in, and
without regard to how superior or subordinate its role in the state generally is. Id.
Lastly, under Article 7, organizations and agencies serving as either territorial
governments or which are not formally part of the state government structure, but
are nonetheless empowered by law to exercise aspects of governmental authority,
shall also entail state responsibility. Id.
173 See id. at 500. Article 8 states as follows:
The conduct of a person or a group shall also be considered as
an act of the State under international law if
(a) it is established that such person or group of persons was
in fact acting on behalf of that State; or
(b) such person or group of persons was in fact exercising
elements of the governmental authority in the absence of the
official authorities and in circumstances which justified the
exercise of those elements of authority. Id.
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government. 17 4 In the cyber warfare context, this remains both an
impractical and dangerous method for determining attribution. The
ease with which cyber warfare activities can be carried out,"'
combined with the inability to generally prove, with any sense of
definiteness, the ultimate source of a cyber attack, makes this method
of attribution severely insufficient.17 6
Ultimately, present international law seeks to address state
responsibility and imputability (or attribution) either by making
States strictly liable for internationally unlawful conduct originating
from within its borders and organizations, 17 7 or by considering
whether a State is subjectively liable for intentionally breaching
established international laws.' 78 Regardless of which approach is
174 The notion of state imputability becomes even more expansive when
taking into account International Court of Justice (ICJ) case law and international
arbitration rulings interpreting state responsibility and attribution. Specifically, in
both Caire Claim and Youmans Claim, it was held that state responsibility would
extend to state actors even when those actors were acting beyond the scope of their
state given authority. See id at 492, 507. In the Caire Claim case, an international
claims commission concluded that the actions of Mexican military personnel would
be attributed to the Mexican government, despite evidence indicating that the
military officers were acting contrary to orders. Id. at 493-94. Likewise, in
Youmans Claim, another international claims commission interpreting international
law held the Mexican government responsible for the actions of its domestic police
when they killed American citizens while attempting to quell a local mob that had
surrounded the home where the American citizens were residing. Id. at 507-08.
17s The number of both individuals and states capable of initiating some
form of cyber attack are problematic. See, e.g., Schaap, supra note 22, at 134
(estimating that over 140 nations have operational cyber warfare programs in
development); Coleman, supra note 57.
176 The fact ultimately remains that this present understanding of attribution
and state responsibility is fundamentally based on the belief that, following an
attack, the source of the attack would be readily discernable. Cyber warfare, on the
other hand, is an attractive military strategy precisely because it is so difficult to
trace to a definite source. See Lipson, supra note 107.
177 See Harris, supra note 130, at 491. This theory of state responsibility is
what Harris terms the risk or objective theory of state responsibility. See id. This
theory requires only that an action of the state be contrary to established
international laws, regardless of the intent behind the action. Id.
171 Id. Harris calls this state responsibility theory the fault or subjective
theory. Id. Unlike the risk theory, state responsibility under this theory requires
both an unlawful action under international law and a subjective intent or
negligence on the part of the state being held responsible for the breach. Id.
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used,179 these theories provide little guidance when the source of the
attack is unknown, as is typically the case in cyber warfare
operations, or at least incapable of definite verification.' 80 Some have
argued that this State responsibility problem is primarily an
evidentiary issue, and that by allowing for a standard of beyond a
reasonable doubt to prove a State's involvement with cyber warfare
operations, the problem can be effectively remedied.' 8' While such
"' Id. International judicial and arbitration practices provide equal support
for the use of either theory of state responsibility, although state practice sheds little
light on which is the more favored approach. See id
ISO See Sinks, supra note 16, at 2. In general, one of the major advantages
of cyber warfare is the ability to conduct such operations with practical complete
anonymity. Id. The recent cyber attack on Estonia serves as a useful example of the
fact that cyber warfare, by its nature, is conducive to covert state military action
that can remain covert when the state carrying out the cyber attack ensures that the
attack cannot be directly traced back to it. See Shackelford, supra note 83, at 24-25.
As Shackelford notes, the attacks on Estonia were largely believed to be the work,
to some degree, of the Russian military. Id. Even more telling are the subsequent
cyber attacks on Georgia in 2008, which interestingly coincided with a
conventional Russian military operation against that state. See McGavran, supra
note 25, at 265-66. Although this may seem to further evidence Russian
governmental involvement in the cyber attacks, others argue that the cyber
bombardment of Georgian Internet infrastructures continued well after the Russian
military operations, and hence were likely not Russian in origin. See Vasanth
Sridharan, Russia Calls Off Attack on Georgia-Cyber Attack Continues, BUSINESS
INSIDER (Aug. 12, 2008), http://www.businessinsider.com/2008/8/russia-calls-off-
attack-on-georgia-cyber-attack-continues. Both the arguments for and against
Russian government involvement in the cyber attacks on Estonia and Georgia have
legitimate merit, evidencing the primary problem with attempting to use current
theories of state responsibility to address attribution in cyber warfare. The
established understandings of international law do not need to be merely
reconsidered and adapted to fit into the cyber warfare regime; rather, these
outmoded international legal concepts must be abandoned in the cyber warfare
context altogether. See infra note 273 (further arguing that a re-evaluation of much
of the international legal paradigm will likely be required to deal with the legality
of cyber warfare operations).
18 See Scott Shackelford, State Responsibility for Cyber Attacks:
Competing Standards for a Growing Problem, SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH
NETWORK (Jan, 12, 2010), http://ssm.com/abstract=1535351. Shackelford notes
that state responsibility has generally been applied in cases where a state
government exercises a sufficient degree of control over another person or entity.
Id. at 5. Two tests have developed to determine whether such control exists. Id.
The first of these tests, called the operational control standard and developed by the
ICJ in the Nicaragua case, requires that non-state actors must act under the
an approach is noble in conception, it could easily result in instances
in which a State is held liable for the conduct of entities engaging in
cyber attacks without that State's support or knowledge.182 Elite
cyber warfare specialists can not only hide their origin, but alter their
apparent location in order to implicate a State that is, in reality, no
way involved in the cyber attacks.183 In the end, the potential
complete control of the state in order to hold that state responsible for the non-state
actor conduct. Id. The second test, called the overall control standard and
developed by the ICTY in the Tadic case, requires only that a state have an
effective degree of control over the conduct of non-state actors to hold their
conduct attributable to the state generally. Id. In subsequent cases, the ICJ has
defined the ICTY overall control standard to require only evidence proving beyond
a reasonable doubt (as opposed to beyond any doubt, as required by the complete
control standard in the Nicaragua case) that the non-state actor conduct was
actually under state control to find state responsibility under international law. Id.
Shackelford notes that, in the cyber warfare context, the ICTY overall control
standard remains preferable because it permits a lower and more realistic burden of
proof to relate a state government to state-sponsored, or even state-directed, attacks
carried out exclusively by non-state actors. Id.; but see infra notes 183-84
(explaining general policy reasons why requiring such a lower burden of proof in
implicating state responsibility for the conduct of non-state actors may be a
dangerous proposition).
182 See Congressional Documents, supra note 96, at 3.
183 See id at 4. According to reports made by the U.S. Congress, it was
noted that the Internet remains inherently trusting in nature and, as such, it does not
typically provide any mechanisms to prevent information from being falsified. Id.
The ability to alter the apparent origin of a cyber attack has been utilized in Iran,
where Internet bloggers have switched their computer settings, in an effort to
confuse and impede government attempts to regulate and censor domestic Internet
traffic and postings, to make it appear as though they are operating from within
Iran. See Crisis in Iran Sparks Global Guerilla Cyberwar, supra note 72; see also
AFP, supra note 14 (Craig Mundie, the Chief Research and Strategy Officer at
Microsoft, said that he believes there are at least ten global states capable of
sophisticated, large-scale cyber warfare attacks, and these states could make the
attacks "appear to come from anywhere"). In particular, DoS attacks, which, as
described earlier in this comment, function by employing the services of thousands
of unknowing computers to simultaneously disable a specific network or computer
server system, allow for this kind of manipulation. See Schaap, supra note 22, at
134; Congressional Documents, supra note 96, at 4. By utilizing computers located
primarily, or even exclusively, within a single state, it would be easy for an
advanced cyber attacker to initiate a DoS attack from one remote location and then
make it appear as though the attack was actually coming from a state where these
infected computers, unbeknownst to either the individual computer users or the
localized state government, are actually located. See Congressional Documents,
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consequences of a misguided accusation, and subsequent kinetic
military reprisals for a mistakenly presumed act of cyber warfare,
seem to outweigh the risk that State governments may illegally
engage in competing actions of small-scale cyber warfare against one
another.184
supra note 96, at 4. It would not be unreasonable to imagine the disastrous
consequences of such a scenario: a China based server infects millions of U.S.
based computers, through which a massive DoS attack is launched against Russia.
See supra note 63 (recall the "Solar Sunrise" attacks in which a young Israeli and
two high school students in the U.S. made a DDoS attack on Department of
Defense systems appear to have originated from the UAE). Naturally, the origin of
the DoS attack will appear to be American and certainly the consequences of such
an attack could be globally catastrophic; Russia has already made it clear that it
would consider nuclear reprisals to cyber warfare attacks to be completely justified
under current international laws. Schaap, supra note 22, at 123; see also Timothy
Thomas, Russian Views on Information Based Warfare, AIRPOWER J. (1996),
available at
http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj96/spec96/thomas.html. Under
the overall control standard advocated by Shackelford and the ICJ, the preceding
hypothetical may very well justify, on grounds beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
cyber attacks originated from the U.S. and Russian retaliation would be justified.
See supra note 181 (detailing the overall control standard requiring attribution
proof beyond a reasonable doubt). This result simply is not tolerable. When states
have publicly declared that they are willing to use nuclear weapons to respond to
cyber warfare operations conducted against them, caution must be the primary
concern and the most stringent burdens of proof must be required before a state is
permitted to hold another state responsible for cyber warfare activities. See infra
note 184.
184 Although Shackelford notes that a more stringent evidentiary showing
will likely have the effect of depriving states that are victims of cyber attacks of
just compensation and reparations, it nonetheless seems that this may be a small
price to pay compared with the potentially catastrophic consequences of allowing
too relaxed of a standard to govern state attribution. See Shackelford, supra note
181, at 8. Furthermore, attribution issues may be less problematic for full-scale
cyber warfare operations simply because there are a limited number of states
capable of such large scale operations; yet, this must be considered in light of the
fact that many states have little to lose in terms of cyber attack retaliation. See
Congressional Documents, supra note 96, at 2. If major states cannot deter cyber
warfare operations, and they cannot achieve much in cyberspace-based retaliation,
then they are left only with the possibility to respond with conventional, kinetic
based warfare. Id. This, again, cannot be condoned or permitted under any form of
international law. Ultimately, the major problem with the use of either the
operation control or overall control standards for determining state responsibility in
international law is that both have been born from an international legal paradigm
insufficient to deal with cyber warfare. As this comment will conclude, it is only by
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2. Jurisdiction Problem
The second major shortcoming of current international law,
making such laws ultimately inapplicable to legal issues raised by
cyber warfare, is jurisdiction. In traditional international law,
jurisdiction was based on the notion of state sovereignty.' 85 It was
this notion that each sovereign state has the inherent right to regulate
and control its own territory that formed the basis of legal
jurisdiction.186 Obviously, state jurisdiction is key to any cyber
warfare analysis, as it controls which state has the right, under
international law, to prosecute' 87 and seek remedy against cyber
warfare aggressors. 88
In considering international legal jurisdiction and cyber
warfare, the first inquiry that must be made is whether a state can
claim actual jurisdiction over cyberspace based on any traditional
re-evaluating and rejecting the current international legal regime that effective
solutions to regulate cyber warfare can emerge. See infra notes 198, 210, 272
(outlining the general problems with traditional international laws application to
cyber warfare in terms of territory, jurisdiction, and the need to reform those
principles).
185 See Kanuck, supra note 26, at 275. State jurisdiction developed, under
customary international law, in what is commonly termed the "Westphalian
system;" under this 1648 treaty system, the international community was
comprised of individually sovereign states that regulated their activities with one
another under the theory of pacta sunt servanda. Id. This international order was
based on an understanding that the fundamental element of state sovereignty was
that each state was subject to the laws and jurisdictions of one another whenever
they ventured into territory claimed by another sovereign state. Id.; see also
RICHARD CRAWFORD PUGH & OSCAR SCHACTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES
AND MATERIALS xxiv (3d ed. 1993).
186 See Kanuck, supra note 26, at 275-76. State jurisdiction is also
commonly defined as "the power of a state under international law to govern
persons and property by its municipal law." Harris, supra note 130, at 264.
Accordingly, state jurisdiction is primarily concerned not with the content of a
state's laws, but with "identify[ing] the persons and property within the permissible
range of a state's law and its procedures for enforcing that law." Id.
187 In addition to the right of a state to seek remedies and reparations for
acts of cyber warfare under international law, an equally important factor is that
often, jurisdiction also controls a state's rights of retaliation, self-defense, and
reprisal under international law. See Sinks, supra note 16, at 15.
188 See id.
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territorial principles.189 There are five standard ways through which a
state, under traditional international law principles, may acquire
territory, and hence, concurrently acquire jurisdiction over that
territory.190 The five methods - conquest, prescription, cession,
natural forces, and occupation -191 all, for varying reasons, remain
inappropriate in application to the cyberspace domain.19 2 The
acquisition of territory through conquest has, over the course of the
past century, become illegitimate under customary international
law. 193 Meanwhile, prescription, cession, and natural forces all
remain inapplicable because they are predicated on factors that
simply do not exist in the cyberspace domain. 194 Territorial
acquisition through prescription is premised on the understanding
that sovereignty has passed from one sovereign to another through
either the passage of time or adverse possession of the disputed
territory.195 In the case of cyberspace jurisdiction, where the problem
is the original acquisition of sovereignty, territorial prescription
provides little guidance.196 Cession is based on the ability of one state
to voluntarily pass its sovereignty to another state.197 Again,
' See WALTER B. WRISTON, THE TWILIGHT OF SOVEREIGNTY xii (1992).
Traditionally, it has been an accepted concept of international law that "sovereignty
has always been, in part, based on the idea of territoriality." Id. at 7. The extent of a
state's jurisdictional reach has typically been directly related to, and even defined
by, its geographic borders. Id.
190 See Harris, supra note 130, at 190-229. Harris provides a comprehensive
overview of the five primary ways international law has historically recognized the
acquisition of territory. Id.
191 See id.
192 See Kanuck, supra note 26, at 288.
193 See Harris, supra note 130, at 218. Although conquest was formerly one
of the most common forms of acquiring territory - and hence, acquiring
jurisdiction over that territory - it became unlawful under customary international
law during the early twentieth century. Id. The 1928 Briand-Kellogg Pact
denouncing "use of force" to acquire territory under international law was further
codified in Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter. Id. Additionally, under the Stimson
doctrine of non-recognition, it has also become customary international law that
states have an active duty to refrain from recognizing as legitimate any territorial
acquisitions made through conquest. Id. at 218-19.
194 See id. at 211-29.
'
95 Id. at 211-13.
196 See Shackelford, supra note 3, at 213.
197 Harris, supra note 130, at 227.
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unfortunately, this mode of territorial acquisition is of little help
when, as is the case with cyberspace, the problem is determining
who, if anyone, has an original claim to cyberspace territorial
jurisdiction.198 Finally, the natural forces territorial principles also
fail to directly apply to cyberspace because they are limited in
application to physical land.199 Cyberspace, as its own territorial
domain, is not subject to the standard notion that naturally occurring
forces may alter territorial boundaries.2 00
Finally, occupation, while potentially applicable to
cyberspace,201 remains inappropriate for both policy and practicality
reasons. 20 2 Thus, in order to determine jurisdiction over cyberspace,
" Shackelford, supra note 3, at 213.
199 Harris, supra note 130, at 229.
200 See id.
201 Some have argued that current international treaty agreements regarding
territory, namely the Antarctic Treaty System and 1967 U.N. Outer Space Treaty,
might also serve as a template for declaring cyberspace a domain over which no
claims of state sovereignty may be made. See Shackelford, supra note 3, at 211-13.
In this sense, the jurisdiction over cyberspace activities would be resolved by
simply not allowing any sovereignty claims at all. Id. at 213. However, this type of
treatment would hardly result in any international legal process for dealing with
legitimate acts of cyber warfare. Id. at 211-16.
202 See id. at 213. Concepts of traditional occupation of territory are simply
not applicable to cyberspace; as Shackelford observes, "unlike the physical world,
cyberspace is an abstract reality of ideas, information, and logic." Id. The
cyberspace domain operates on the condition that, although accessed through
computer systems located within a defined territory, it exists across all physical
territorial boundaries without obstruction. Id. at 212-13. Ultimately, cyberspace
destroys the traditional mode of occupational territory because it erodes the
assumed connection between territory and sovereignty. Id. Shackelford suggests
using the "common heritage of mankind" principle to regulate state sovereignty
over the cyberspace domain; as he observes, a key element of such an approach
would be the non-militaristic nature of cyberspace. Id. at 213. However, the fact is
that most states technologically capable of exploiting cyberspace for military
purposes have already begun to do so. Id. Although noble in concept, it remains
highly unlikely that, given the massive amounts of time and money expended on
such cyber warfare strategies and military development, states would simply
abandon those efforts for the common good of global access to the cyberspace
domain.
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and the cyber warfare operations occurring in that domain, a new
understanding of territory must be reached.203
The second necessary inquiry regarding the jurisdiction
problem is whether any of the traditional jurisdiction principles
already existing and applicable under the present international law
regime can also be applied to cyber warfare operations. 204 in
considering the five traditional modes of acquiring criminal
jurisdiction for international crimes - territorial, active nationality,
protective security, passive nationality, and universality - it
becomes apparent that several of these theories may be helpful in
deciding jurisdiction over cyber warfare operations. 2 05 Although the
active and passive nationality principles remain potentially applicable
to instances of non-state actor cyber attacks,206 it is the territorial,
protective security, and universality principles that would create a far
203 This new understanding is one of the primary considerations that must
be dealt with during, as this comment concludes, a necessary reformulation of the
international legal paradigm designed specifically to cater to the issue of cyber
warfare operations. See infra notes 238, 242, 249.
204 See Harris, supra note 130, at 264. This inquiry is principally limited to
a consideration of the traditional international legal principles of jurisdiction as
related to criminal jurisdiction. Civil jurisdiction over other sovereign states is,
under current international law, limited to only a requirement of a substantial
connection between the victim and accused parties. Id.; see also F.A. Mann, The
Doctrine of Jurisdiction in International Law, 111 RECUEIL DES Cours 1 (Vol. 1
1964).
205 Sinks, supra note 16, at 15. Indeed, arguments have already been made
advancing the possibility of adopting a jurisdictional scheme applicable to cyber
warfare based on the territorial, nationality, and protective security principles. Id.
206 See Harris, supra note 130, at 265, 279, 298. The active nationality
principle would allow the state representing the nationality of the guilty party to
acquire jurisdiction over them; the passive personality principle would allow the
state representing the nationality of the victim to acquire jurisdiction. Id. However,
because each of these jurisdictional theories is predicated on the nationality of a
single citizen, either victim or liable party, it seems inappropriate to use them in the
context of state-sponsored cyber warfare operations. Another major problem with
the use of any of the criminal jurisdiction principles in the context of state
sponsored cyber warfare is that, under traditional international law, states are not
subject to criminal jurisdiction, only individuals are. See id. at 309 (traditional
notions of state immunity do not allow for one state to be tried in another states
courts absent consent).
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more efficient basis for determining jurisdiction over state-attributed
cyber warfare. 20 7
The territorial principle allows jurisdiction by either the state
in which the crime occurs, the objective territorial principle, or where
the effects of the crime are felt, the subjective territorial principle.208
Although it is difficult to trace and determine the origin of cyber
attacks, there is nonetheless a physical location constituting the site
from which the cyberspace-based attacks are actually launched.2 09
The protective security principle2 10 would also apply to cyber warfare
operations because large-scale cyber attacks certainly threaten the
national interests of the state-victim of such attacks. 2 11 Finally, the
jurisdiction over cyber warfare attacks could also be determined
using the universality principle2 12 if the attacks were of such a nature
as to constitute a breach of customary international law. 2 13
While currently existing criminal jurisdiction principles could
be applied to acts of cyber warfare, such application would still
necessitate a severe alteration of the existing international legal
paradigm. 2 14 However, although the application of the universality
207 See Sinks, supra note 16, at 15-17.
208 See Harris, supra note 130, at 278.
209 See Sinks, supra note 16, at 16-17.
210 Harris, supra note 130, at 288. Harris defines the protective security
principle as allowing a state whose national security is endangered by the unlawful
action to acquire jurisdiction. Id. The primary requirement for asserting such
jurisdiction is merely that there is a sufficient "linking point" between the one over
whom jurisdiction is sought and the national security interests of the state seeking
jurisdiction over them. Id. at 286.
2" Sinks, supra note 16, at 15-16.
212 Harris, supra note 130, at 288-89. The universality principle is defined
as the ability to acquire jurisdiction based solely on the nature of the crime
committed. Id.
213 Id. When peremptory norms of international law, rights that states
cannot, under any circumstances violate or deviate from, are breached, any state
within the recognized international community retains the right to acquire
jurisdiction over the guilty party. Id Common examples of such peremptory norms
are war crimes and piracy. Id. This principle, along with the protective security
principle, was invoked by Israel in order to acquire jurisdiction over the head of the
Nazi Gestapo during the Holocaust. Id. at 280.
214 Each of these principles of jurisdiction is normally used to allow one
state to acquire jurisdiction over individuals of a differing nationality; normally,
sovereign states are not subject to the jurisdiction of other states without their
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principle would require such significant re-evaluation - an argument
that will ultimately be endorsed in part three of this comment -215
the current territorial principle may also remain applicable when used
in an effects-based context.216 Under this theory, jurisdiction for
cyber warfare attacks could be based on the location where the
effects of the attack are felt.217 Although this may help resolve the
issue of jurisdiction, it would do little more than transfer the burden
of identifying the culprit behind the attack to a victim-state that,
because of that attack, is likely to be even less equipped to trace the
origin of the cyber-based strike.2 18 Ultimately, the problems of
jurisdiction, like those of attribution, seem to lead inexorably to the
consent. See id. at 307-08. This state immunity concept gives states immunity from
the jurisdiction of other states so long as they are acting within the general scope of
public, state-related activities (the modern formation of restrictive immunity). Id.
As such, in order to acquire jurisdiction over another sovereign state for liability for
cyber warfare operations, a new legal precedent permitting the trial of a state for
criminal penalties under international law would need to be formed. Another,
perhaps more realistic, option would be to extend the jurisdictional reach of
international tribunals, or the creation of a new international tribunal dealing
exclusively with monitoring compliance with international cyber warfare law and
endowed with global power to enforce decisions regarding liability for breaches of
those laws. See infra note 267 and accompanying text (Shackelford proposes a
global force pooling resources and working to prevent, identify, and punish cyber
warfare aggressors).
215 The need for a large scale overhaul of the existing international legal
structure is not intended to make the current regime applicable to cyber warfare;
rather, it requires the creation of a new branch of international law, founded on
traditional principles but discarding those principles completely when necessary, to
effectively cohere to the revolutionary requirements of cyber warfare legality. See
Kanuck, supra note 26, at 288; Sinks, supra note 16, at 16-17; Shackelford, supra
note 3, at 214.
216 See Shackelford, supra note 3, at 211-12; Kanuck, supra note 26, at
286-87.
217 See id.; see also Pugh & Schacter, supra note 185, at 1049. Although
this doctrine holds some promise for establishing jurisdiction over acts of cyber
warfare, it remains plagued by the same attribution problem that haunts all
traditional, international legal jurisdictional methods. See Kanuck, supra note 26, at
287. Ultimately, "[a]ny comprehensive regulatory structure based on physical
location thus seems grossly inadequate." Id.
218 See Shackelford, supra note 3, at 214. The interconnectivity of the
attribution problem and the jurisdiction problem are evident; while the ability of a
state to have a valid jurisdictional claim over a cyberspace attacker is critical, such
an ability is rendered utterly useless unless that attacker can be identified. Id.
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same conclusion: cyberspace and cyber warfare operations transcend
the most fundamental assumptions underlying traditional
international law and, as such, it is only through the creation of a new
international legal paradigm that effective solutions can emerge.2 1 9
3. "Use of Force" Problem
Perhaps the most critical problem with seeking to apply the
current international legal regime to cyber warfare is the general
uncertainty surrounding what constitutes "use of force,"220 and,
accordingly, what self-defense responses remain permissible
reactions under international law.221
Under current, customary international law, codified in the
U.N. Charter Article 2(4),222 defining an act as a "use of force" is
219 See Kanuck, supra note 26, at 288 ("Even in the most abstract sense, the
notion of territory [and its corollary on possessory rights] can only imperfectly
account for the information realm. Cyberspace and information alike transcend
physical boundaries, thereby requiring a legal paradigm that looks beyond merely
the locus of events."). As will be proposed in part three of this comment, cyber
warfare is a unique and problematic international legal issue and will inevitably
require "a reformulation of those [traditional, international, and legal] concepts to
accommodate the imminent transnational society that will function predominantly
in the borderless realm of cyberspace." Id. at 286.
220 See e.g., Sinks, supra note 16, at 18-19; Matthew Hoisington,
Cyberwarfare and the Use of Force Giving Rise to the Right of Self Defense, 32
B.C. INT'L & COMP L. REV. 439, 446 (2009); West, supra note 154, at 17.
221 See McGavran, supra note 25, at 268. Both the attribution and
jurisdiction problems are most critical for response purposes: a state besieged by a
large scale cyber warfare attack will likely not want to seek international legal
sanctions against the attacking state, but rather it will want to know, under
international law, to what degree may they respond to such an attack. See id.
222 Current international law reflects the U.N. Charter 2(4), which states the
following: "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state,
or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." U.N.
Charter art. 2, para 4, available at
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapterl.shtml (last visited Oct. 29,
2010). It has been argued that the phrase "any other manner inconsistent with the
Purposes of the United Nations" does permit the "use of force" when such action
would be consistent with the preservation of international peace, harmony, and
principles of the inherent right to self determination, as formative goals of the U.N.
generally. See Definition of Aggression, United Nations General Assembly
Resolution 3314 (XXIX), UNIV. OF MINN. HUMAN RIGHTS LIBRARY,
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important for two reasons. First, if an act is defined as a "use of
force", it is presumptively illegal under both customary international
law and the U.N. Charter. 2 23 Second, if an action is defined as a "use
of force" under these provisions, retaliation by the victim state may
be expressly permitted by those same provisions.2 24 While the
importance of defining an act of cyber warfare as "use of force," and
hence illegal under international law, is apparent, 22 5 the attribution
issue also makes cyber warfare problematic in terms of self-
defense. 22 6
http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/GAres3314.html (last visited Oct. 29,
2010).
223 See id.; see also McGavran, supra note 25, at 269 (recognition of an act
as a "use of force" under the U.N. Charter is a threshold issue in considering
international legality).
224 Article 51 of the U.N. Charter permits a sovereign state to respond to
"use of force" against it; it reads as follows:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security
Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in
the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately
reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect
the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the
present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems
necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and
security.
U.N. Charter art. 51, available at
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml (last visited Oct 29, 2010).
225 The ability to define a cyber warfare operation as a "use of force"
would, of course, make the action illegal under the U.N. Charter and hence, at the
very least, would entitle the victim state to the support of much of the international
community. See Definition of Aggression, supra note 222. More importantly,
international treaties purporting to advance collective action against a state that
aggressively acts against one of its members would likely become effective if a
cyber attack were defined as a "use of force." See McGavran, supra note 25, at
270-71.
226 See Shackelford, supra note 3, at 237 (in order for U.N. article 51 on
self-defense to become legitimately applicable, the state using that force would
need to be identified in order for any kind of retaliation to be justified). However,
when confronted with a true instance of cyber attack on a member state, the U.N.
was "conspicuously silent;" after the 2008 cyber assault against Estonia, the U.N.
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However, the ability to use force in an international setting is
not merely restricted by the U.N. Charter to self-defense measures
under article 51; rather, the U.N. Security Council, pursuant to
Chapter 7 of the Charter, is also authorized to use force to ensure
international peace and security.2 27
Ultimately, fitting cyber warfare into the customary scheme of
"use of force" as defined in the U.N. Charter is both problematic and
uncertain.2 28 While the traditional methods of determining whether
an assault falls within the U.N. definition of aggression2 29 and "use of
force" have remained questionable, 2 30 a far more appropriate and
effective results-based analysis has begun to emerge. 23 1
did little to respond to or identify the status of such an attack under the U.N.
Charter. Id. at 238. Such inaction ultimately only served to "[belie] the continuing
legal uncertainty of cyber attacks in the international system." Id. at 236-37; see
also Schaap, supra note 22, at 146-47 (further noting that NATO also did not seem
to consider the attacks on Estonia a "use of force" sufficient to invoke collective
self-defense provisions of the NATO treaty, instead considering the acts to be more
akin to cyber crime or terrorism).
227 U.N. Charter art. 43-44, available at
http://www.un.ori/en/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml. Chapter 7 of the U.N.
Charter expressly authorizes the U.N. Security Council to use means involving
armed forces to secure international peace and security. Id. The U.N. Security
Council famously authorized the "use of force" under chapter 7 of Security Council
Resolution 678 when it requested that "all necessary means" be used to enforce its
decisions against the resistance of the Iraqi state. Harris, supra note 130, at 960-61.
228 Compare Sinks, supra note 16, at 18 (noting that some elites simply do
not feel that cyber attacks can be adequately defined under the conventional "force"
or "aggression" definitions of the U.N. Charter) with Schaap, supra note 22, at 147
(recognizing that a cyber attack which causes physical damage may be treated
under the U.N. Charter as a "use of force").
229 See Definition of Aggression, supra note 222. The U.N. General
Assembly officially addressed and defined aggression in 1974 when it introduced
Resolution 3314 (XXIX); the resolution, in Article 1, defines aggression generally
as "the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or
political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with
the Charter of the United Nations ..... Id.
230 See McGavran, supra note 25, at 269-70. Three emerging theories that
have been developed and applied to the consideration of whether cyber warfare fits
into the traditional "use of force" definition are the instrumentality, target-based,
and consequentiality approaches. Id. Under the instrumentality approach, cyber
warfare would be treated as outside of the "use of force" definition because such
attacks differ from conventional, kinetic military assaults. Id. The target-based
approach would consider cyber warfare as a "use of force," as defined under the
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As opposed to the traditional mode of determining "use of
force" based on the nature of the assault, considering the effects of a
cyber warfare attack is a better method for determining the
international legal status of such incidents.232 Under the former
mode, many types of cyber warfare attacks would not be considered
internationally unlawful, despite the fact that they may produce real
world, kinetic damage equal to or surpassing the destruction wrought
by conventional military weaponry. 23 3  The latter approach,
meanwhile, is based on considering whether the effects of cyber
attack are sufficiently similar to damage caused by conventional
kinetic military assaults. 2 34 Such an approach allows for flexibility
U.N. Charter, whenever it penetrates a state's critical infrastructure. Id. Finally, the
consequentiality approach would consider cyber attacks to be a "use of force" if the
attack produces damages equivalent to traditional military attacks. Id. However,
each of these theories, considered individually, has been considered inadequate as
either under- or over-inclusive in their consideration of what cyber warfare attacks
would qualify as a "use of force." Id.; see generally Hollis, supra note 84, at 1040-
41 (Hollis provides a more detailed analysis of each of these theories and a
discussion of why each proves "inadequate in the modem context"); Shackelford,
supra note 83, at 26 (it remains unclear when a cyber attack would actually rise to
the level of an armed attack under international law). But see Sharp, supra note
155, at 234. Sharp argues that the currently existing international legal structure
sufficiently encompasses cyber warfare; he feels that the vast majority of cyber
warfare operations would fall within the present definition of "use of force" and
hence be unlawful under international law. Id. Nevertheless, Sharp does concede
that such a conclusion would be primarily rooted in considering the effects, not the
general mode, of the cyber attack. Id.
231 See Kanuck, supra note 26, at 288-89; see also Sinks, supra note 16, at
18-19.
232 Kanuck, supra note 26, at 289.
233 Id. The Judge Advocate General for International Law of the United
States Navy stated that although information manipulation may at some point
qualify as "use of force", that threshold has not yet been adequately defined. David
L. Pierce, Address at the Judge Advocate General Information Warfare Convention
(June 8, 1995). As a result of the varying theories used to place cyber warfare
attacks in the "use of force" sphere, there is a continual risk that legitimate and
destructive attacks would not be considered a "use of force" due to the cyberspace
nature of those attacks. McGavran, supra note 25, at 270-71; see also Kanuck,
supra note 26, at 289 (cyber warfare operations which interfered with a state's
financial systems or power grids would likely not qualify as "aggression" and
hence would not be a use of force despite their "crippling effects").
234 See Sinks, supra note 16, at 19. Sinks notes that cyber warfare has
evolved to a level of technological advancement whereby a kinetic attacks can be
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and could serve as an appropriate mix of the theories already
advanced in determining what cyber warfare actions should
constitute a "use of force."
Michael Schmitt, the Dean of International Law at the George
C. Marshall Center, has advanced a theory similar to this effects-
based notion.235 Schmitt's proposed theory combines both the effects
of the cyber attack and the intent behind the attack.236 Thus, any
cyber attack that does actually cause, or may foreseeably cause,
widespread injury, destruction, or death may be considered a "use of
force" under the existing legal paradigm.237 This theory to determine
when cyber warfare qualifies as a "use of force" would not only
allow for more destructive forms of cyber warfare assault, regardless
of the type of weaponry utilized,238 to be appropriately deemed
internationally unlawful, but it also would greatly assist states in
determining what cyber warfare responses would be legitimate under
Article 51 self-defense.23 9
carried out completely in the absence of any kinetic weaponry, via cyber warfare.
Id. Regardless, some commentators maintain the belief that certain instances of
cyber warfare would clearly qualify as a "use of force" under the U.N. Charter and
customary international law. See Jason Barkham, Information Warfare and
International Law on the Use of Force, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 57, 80-81
(2001). Cyber attacks that preclude or are carried out in tandem with conventional
military operations would, according to these commentators, qualify as a cyber
warfare "use of force." Id.
235 See Schaap, supra note 22, at 147-48.
236 Id.
237 Id.; see also Sinks, supra note 16, at 20-22. Many have argued that
cyber warfare operations require such an "expansion of the definition on the 'use of
force' because a failure to do so would result in many destructive cyber warfare
operations simply falling outside of the current definition, and hence not being
considered illegal under traditional international laws. Id. at 20; see also Barkham,
supra note 234, at 58.
238 See Schaap, supra note 22, at 147-48. The weapons of cyber warfare are
often seemingly benign, or at least fairly harmless, when considered individually; it
is often only in the aggregate, such as with DDoS attacks, that the full destructive
power of such weaponry becomes apparent. See id. Evaluating whether a cyber
warfare attack qualifies as a "use of force" by considering both the intent and the
consequences of the attack account for this oft forgotten fact.
239 Id.; see also Sinks, supra note 16, at 20 ("International scholars
recommend, 'clearer rules of what kinds of information warfare actions constitute
an armed attack,' which drives permissible responses of self-defense"). Whether, in
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In the end, the ability to identify a cyber warfare assault as a
"use of force" will both inform the legality of that assault under
international law and address the limits of internationally lawful self-
defense responses to such an assault.240 While there are indications
that the international community has begun to recognize that a
consequence-based consideration of cyber warfare operations is
needed to adequately determine whether cyber warfare qualifies as a
"use of force,"241 it is only through a combination of a result-oriented
approach with an additional intent consideration that cyber warfare
can be effectively defined under international law.
IV. THE FUTURE OF CYBER WARFARE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
Cyber warfare operations require a new and revolutionary
reconsideration of many of the most fundamental principles
underlying current international law. 24 2 Specifically, the present
international legal regime must adapt in three primary ways. First, the
critical concepts of attribution, jurisdiction, and "use of force" must
be reexamined and altered to meet the exigencies created by the
proliferation of cyber warfare operations. Second, consistent
definitions of cyber warfare must be formed which either fit cyber
warfare into existing international legal modes, or, more likely, a new
area of international law must be developed to consider the issues
response to an attributed cyber attack, Article 51 on self-defense would permit the
use of conventional, kinetic military response (bombing the location from which
the cyber attack originated, for example) is an important question which, although
beyond the scope of the "use of force" discussion here, will be yet another critical
consideration for the international legal community. See id.
240 See Schaap, supra note 22, at 148-49.
241 See Sinks, supra note 16, at 21 (in the international community, there is
a "growing recognition that an assertion of jurisdiction over offences abroad having
an intended and substantial effect within a state may be justified"). By looking at
the consequences of a cyber warfare assault, and concurrently considering the
intentions behind that assault, international law will be better able to conclude
whether the assault should be considered a "use of force," and thus illegal under
international law.
242 See Kanuck, supra note 26, at 290 (arguing that certain existing
international laws, inapplicable to cyber warfare, must be "exchanged for a new
paradigm that addresses the deleterious activities of nation-states in a global
sense").
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raised by non-traditional, cyber-based warfare activities. Lastly,
international agreements must be formed immediately to limit and
define cyber warfare while it is still in its infancy as a global concept
and military strategy.
A. Evolution
In order for international law to effectively address the issues
raised by cyber warfare operations, the traditional international legal
regime must adapt to the core factor driving the development of
cyber warfare: technology.243 Throughout history, the international
legal regime has adapted to technological advances, indicating that it
both can, and must, continue to adapt and evolve alongside the ever-
changing realm of technology. 2 44
Critical to the evolution of international laws are the necessary
alterations to traditional understandings of attribution, jurisdiction,
and "use of force." While traditional international law assumes that
attribution of State military operations will be fairly straightforward,
cyber warfare has made evident that this assumption is not always
true.245 Rather, new theories of attribution must be developed by the
international community to address the difficulty in tracing cyber-
based attacks.24 6 Further, until such a globally supported notion can
be developed, a more strict attribution requirement should be
maintained in order to avoid the potentially catastrophic
consequences of full-scale cyber warfare based on anything less than
absolutely certain State attribution. 2 47
243 Harris, supra note 130, at 16.
244 Id. Harris observes that international law has always been forced to
change in correlation to the advances of science. Id. Specifically, Harris recalls that
international law had to be altered to accommodate the nuances of territorial
definitions when outer space and the deep-sea bed became legitimate areas of
global exploitation. Id. The preferred approach, according to Harris, is a good one:
there is a constant need for international law to "[revise] thinking about some
existing rules and [cause] the introduction of new ones." Id.
245 See Lipson, supra note 107.
246 See supra notes 180-81 and accompanying text; see also Shackelford,
supra note 3, at 246 ("[t]he fog of identity in cyberspace necessitates the creation
of a legal regime that takes into account a level of uncertainty").
247 See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
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Secondly, international legal concepts of jurisdiction must also
evolve to accommodate the technological innovation that underpins
the development of cyber warfare. 248 While the traditional forms of
establishing state jurisdiction over internationally unlawful conduct
prove inadequate for dealing with instances of cyber warfare, 24 9 new
modes of jurisdiction must be developed by the international
community that take into account the unique characteristics of the
cyberspace domain. 2 50
Finally, the international definition and understanding of what
constitutes an unlawful "use of force" under the U.N. Charter and
customary international law must also evolve to account for cyber
warfare operations. 2 5' Although a present consideration of cyber
warfare as a "use of force" under international law may be inadequate
and uncertain, there are developing proposals that call for redefining
"use of force" to better accommodate cyber warfare operations by
considering both the effects of, and intent behind, a cyber attack.252
In the modem world, cyber warfare is reshaping the global
community, and laws regulating and defining acceptable global
behavior must be created either by adapting the current international
legal regime or by building a completely new international legal
248 Schaap, supra note 22, at 172-73 ("One of the greatest challenges of
law is keeping up with the advancement of technology. The international
community has often struggled to implement standards of conduct in a timely
manner regarding the advancement of weaponry").
249 See supra notes 190-92 and accompanying text (relating the traditional
modes of establishing state jurisdiction and why each remains inadequate in the
cyber warfare context).
250 See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
251 See McGavran, supra note 25, at 271 (noting that "[i]t is critical,
however, that workable definitions be adopted to fit cyber attacks into the 'use of
force' and 'armed attack' context").
252 See supra note 237 and accompanying text. The notion that cyber
warfare attacks should be considered in terms of both effect and intent to determine
if they fall within the notion of "use of force" may also serve to effectively
overcome the problems of over- and under-inclusiveness plaguing traditional "use
of force" approaches. See McGavran, supra note 25, at 272. Consequently, states
would be more certain of "how their actions, and actions taken against them, will
be judged on the international stage." Id. Further, such an approach would provide
a "solid basis on which states could model new international agreements to regulate
cyber attacks into existing 'use of force' terms." Id.
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structure developed specifically to address cyber warfare.2 53 The
evolution of international legal concepts to mirror the simultaneous
developments in cyber warfare technology is a key element in
defining and regulating this new field.254
B. Consistency
While the evolution of international legal concepts of
attribution, jurisdiction, and "use of force" are all necessary elements
to the development of an international legal paradigm capable of
dealing with cyber warfare, it is only through the consistent
definition and application of such evolving principles that those
changes can become truly ingrained within the international
community.255
At present, the international community lacks consistency
regarding even the most basic aspects of cyber warfare; in particular,
there is no universally agreed upon definition of what even
constitutes "cyber warfare."256 This inability to achieve international
253 Harris, supra note 130 (there is a constant need for international law to
"[revise] thinking about some existing rules and [cause] the introduction of new
ones").
254 Some commentators make the point that technology may simply be too
fast advancing for international law to keep up. See West, supra note 154, at 24
(arguing that "[t]he rate of technology will outpace the ability for an international
cyber regime to produce responsive policy"). Although such concerns are
legitimate, the combination of international agreements and the development of jus
cogens, customary international legal principles, to dictate the legality of cyber
warfare will nonetheless serve to best regulate this advancing technological field.
See infra note 266-67 (Shackelford's proposals on regulating cyber warfare call for
either creating a new international legal regime specifically tailored to suit cyber
warfare, or constructing international agreements that draw on existing
international legal principles and introduce new international legal concepts as
needed).
255 See McGavran, supra note 25, at 270-71. \
256 See Schaap, supra note 22, at 126 ("there is no widely accepted
definition of 'cyber warfare"'); Shackelford, supra note 3, at 199 (arguing that
cyber warfare is a misnomer, and instead, "information warfare" is the more
appropriate term; although conceding that even that term is susceptible to
"definitions and conceptions . . . as numerous as they are complex"); Sinks, supra
note 16, at 5-6 (noting the various definitions of cyber warfare).
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consensus on even the most fundamental aspects of cyber warfare
underscores the fact that such uncertainty invites cyber warfare
operations during the intermediate flux of legal uncertainty and lack
of enforcement against such attacks by the international
1257
community.
Further, once internationally consistent definitions and
regulations have been formed, the international community must
uniformly and strictly enforce those standards. 2 58 Failure to enforce
these standards may create a scenario, familiar in history, where
banned weaponry continues to be developed and could eventually be
used, despite international prohibitions on such use. 2 59
C. International Agreements
There has been significant debate over whether the
international community needs new treaties to deal with the
revolutionary problems created by cyber warfare. 260 However, the
257 McGavran, supra note 25, at 271 ("As long as nations disagree over the
definition of a cyber attack, they will be able to pigeonhole cyber attacks as either
uses of force or not to suit their immediate political needs").
258 See Malawer, supra note 13, at 30-3 1.
259 One commentator has compared the consequences of failing to regulate
and to enforce regulations against cyber warfare to the development of aircraft
carriers following World War I. Id. Although general disarmament conferences and
treaties were formed to limit the development of new naval technologies after the
devastation of WWI, the crucial failure to address and strongly enforce regulations
against aircraft carrier development, at the time the most advanced weaponry
technology being developed, led inexorably to future wars, with aircraft carriers
leading the way. Id. The failure of the international community to act quickly to
regulate and cohesively enforce regulations against developing military technology
made international agreements regarding such technology "'hallow results' [that]
proved to be a monument to illusion."' Id. To avoid repeating such mistakes with
cyber warfare technology, such weaponry must be consistently defined and
regulated under international law, and, most critically, those regulations must be
enforced by the international community as a united whole.
260 See Shackelford, supra note 83, at 26 (Shackelford proposes that
"[g]iven the confused legal regime, the best way to ensure a comprehensive regime
is through a new international accord dealing exclusively with cyber security and
its status in international law"). But see McGavran, supra note 25, at 272-73
(noting that many continue to believe that cyber warfare concerns are overblown
and international treaties regulating cyber warfare would be a waste of resources
and political energies); Julian Ku, Does the World Need a CyberWarfare Arms
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need for international agreements is critical to realizing the
evolutionary changes in international law and the consistency
required to afford such changes' staying power amongst the global
community.h261ile some have commented that international
agreements regulating cyber warfare will not do much in the way of
deterring terrorist and criminal organizations from conducting cyber
warfare operations,2 62 such agreements would nonetheless serve to
unite the global community in identifying and holding these groups
accountable through a well-defined international prohibition against
such activities.
Recently, there have been signs that the international
community may be both ready and willing to begin seriously
considering the formation of international treaties and binding
agreements to regulate cyber warfare operations.2 63 Many, apparently
Limitation Treaty?, OPINIO JuRIs (June 7, 2010, 9:26 AM),
http://opiniojuris.or/2010/06/07/does-the-world-need-a-cyberwarfare-arms-
limitation-treaty/ (arguing that international agreements to limit cyber warfare
operations would impede efforts to battle cyber crime and non-state cyber warfare
activities because the investigating state would be bound by the agreements, while
the aggressor would not be bound); West, supra note 154, at 21-23 (arguing against
the creation of an international treaty to deal with cyber warfare).
261 See Martin Pineda, International Law Must Adapt to Cyber Warfare,
THE CORD (Feb. 9, 2011, 12:23 AM), http://cord.hotink.net/articles/42049 ("It is
necessary that the international community recognize the importance of
collaboration on extensions of international law specific to cyber warfare").
262 See West, supra note 154, at 23. West argues that the creation of
international law regulating cyber warfare would actually cripple the efforts to
deter and fight terrorist groups who would likely continue to use weapons
unaffected by any international legal restrictions. Id. However, this is a dangerous
reason to decline to limit state use of cyber warfare; if this reasoning were
followed, nuclear arms treaties would also be pointless because terrorist groups are
not likely to consider international law if afforded the opportunity to utilize such
weaponry. The fact that some groups will not feel obligated to follow international
laws does not lead to the conclusion that such international regulations should not
be created. West also makes the argument that cyber warfare, as a primarily non-
lethal weapon technology, may be the lesser of two evils, and that international
agreements limiting the use of such weaponry may have the more undesirable
effect of increasing the use of more conventional kinetic military weaponry. Id. at
22.
263 See Shackelford, supra note 3, at 250 ("There is evidence that at least
some subset of countries, namely NATO, have begun international efforts aimed at
increasing collaboration to prevent, investigate, and respond to attacks as they
occur").
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realizing that the presently existing international legal regime is
inadequate to cope with the novel legal issues raised by cyber
warfare, have come to understand the inherent advantage of definite
international agreements on the legality of such activities. 264 The
need for international agreements regulating cyber warfare operations
has recently been endorsed by groups within the U.N. 265 and
Russia.2 66
While there are inherent problems with seeking to formulate
agreeable international treaties to address cyber warfare,2 67 such
agreements remain the best option for dealing with a global threat
264 See David Elliot, Weighing the Case for a Convention to Limit
Cyberwarfare, ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION (Nov. 2009),
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009 1 1/Elliot. Although attempts to use
traditional international law may be useful in dealing with the legality of cyber
warfare, restrictions based on international law precedent would have "an uncertain
outcome" and would lack the "normative value of an explicit agreement." Id. See
also Shackelford, supra note 3, at 250 (noting that the international community
must recognize the need for new international legal structures to address cyber
warfare, and "to consider cyber attacks as the revolutionary threat that they are to
the security and welfare of citizens around the world" in order for "real and lasting
progress to be made").
265 See AFP, supra note 14. The U.N. International Telecommunications
Union secretary, Hamadoun Tour6, proposed that an international treaty be formed
between global powers that addresses the legality of cyber warfare operations and
under which States would not use cyber warfare as an offensive, first-strike
weapon. Id.
266 See Tom Gjelton, Shadow Wars: Debating Cyber 'Disarmament',
WORLD AFFAIRS J. (Nov./Dec. 2010),
http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/shadow-wars-debating-cyber-
disarmament. For over a decade, Russian officials have stressed the need for, and
actively advocated for, international treaty agreements limiting cyber warfare
operations. Id. But see John Markoff & Andrew Kramer, U.S. and Russia Differ on
a Treaty for Cyberspace, N.Y. Times (June 27, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/28/world/28cyber.html (the Russian plans for an
international treaty agreement to address cyber warfare have been troubled by
disagreement with the U.S. over how comprehensive the coverage of the agreement
will actually be).
267 See Shackelford, supra note 83, at 26. The "increasingly multipolar state
of world affairs and the resultant difficulty of reaching consensus on key issues
facing the international community" are certainly challenges that will face any
international treaty dealing with cyber warfare. Id.
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that promises to rapidly grow more problematic. 26 8 Existing
international treaty structures and cybercrime agreements could
provide a workable foundation on which cyber warfare treaties could
be built,269 and cooperation amongst the global community is a
critical element to the success of any such treaty. 2 70 Ultimately,
serious changes in international law may be required to address the
legal issues raised by cyber warfare operations, and it remains likely
that a reevaluation of the core, fundamental components of traditional
international legal structures will be required.271 International treaties
268 See Elliot, supra note 264, at 22 (noting the importance in
"constrain[ing] this form of warfare in the relatively early stages of its
development"). See also Scott J. Shackelford, Estonia Two-an-a-Half Years Later:
A Progress Report on Combating Cyber Attacks, J. INTERNET L. (forthcoming),
http://ssm.com/abstract=1499849. An international treaty or agreement likely
remains the best option for quickly and effectively dealing with cyber warfare. Id.
According to Shackelford, such an international treaty would require three key
elements to be truly effective: first, it would need to "define when a cyber attack
rises to the level of an armed attack;" second, it must "clarify which provisions of
international law apply during cyber warfare;" and third, it should "provide for
enforcement mechanisms in the event of breach." Id.
269 See Amit, supra note 69, at 7. Amit "foresee[s] a move towards
international cyber-treaties which would be based on the lessons learned at the field
battling cybercrime." Id. He also considers the possibility that international treaty
agreements regulating the use of other kinds of weaponry, such as the U.S. and
Russia nuclear arms treaty, may serve as useful blueprints for subsequent cyber
warfare treaties. Id. Others believe that the 2001 E.U. Council Convention on
Cybercrime would be a useful place to begin formulating cyber warfare treaties.
Malawer, supra note 13, at 30.
270 See Shackelford, supra note 83, at 27. Shackelford, in evaluating the
responses of the international community to the need to regulate cyber warfare
internationally, especially in the wake of the 2007 attacks on Estonia, notes the
following: "Collective action is required. It is that collective action which has been
missing over the past three years [since the cyber attacks on Estonia]." Id.
271 See id. Shackelford also proposes a "polycentric approach" for
addressing cyber warfare under international law. Id. Under this approach,
regulatory solutions would be addressed at all levels. Id. Shackelford proposes that
cooperative efforts of major global States and organizations could join together to
address cyber warfare attribution and the enforcement of such regulations. Id.
Specifically, Shackelford pictures a scenario in which a global organization, such
as NATO, partners with a system of state-sponsored Cyber Emergency Response
Teams (CERTs) to root out state-sponsors of cyber attacks, to pool resources and
talent to defend against cyber attacks, and to provide intelligence to solve
attribution problems. Id.
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and agreements present the most direct, effective, and rapid means of
implementing these needed changes.272
V. CONCLUSION
Cyber warfare is a burgeoning technology that allows a
computer savvy user to disrupt other computer networks and
programs in various ways. 273 More advanced forms of cyber warfare
can result in destruction of property and State infrastructure
equivalent to, if not surpassing, most forms of conventional, kinetic
warfare. 274 However, such cyber warfare is unique in that it operates
within the borderless domain of cyberspace. 275 As such, cyber
warfare remains impervious to many traditional international legal
regulations and constraints. 2 76 While some international laws may be
altered, adapted, and enhanced to take cyber warfare operations into
account,277 it may be an inevitable reality that the traditional
international legal regime may simply be inadequate to accommodate
272 Ultimately, international treaty agreements may only be the first step
towards such a reevaluation and reformation of international laws applicable to
cyber warfare operations. However, the first step is the most important, and, as
Shackelford has aptly observed, "[t]he status quo strategic ambiguity is
unsustainable and is a threat to international peace and security." Shackelford,
supra note 83, at 27.
273 See McGavran, supra note 25, at 261. The various ways in which cyber
warfare weaponry can be utilized is also outlined in more detail in the section "The
Weapons of Cyber Warfare" of this comment.
274 See McGavran, supra note 25, at 261 (a DoS cyber attack could be used
to shut down a State's air traffic control system, causing numerous casualties);
Schaap, supra note 22, at 147 (noting that cyber attacks may result in physical
damage); Shackelford, supra note 3, at 193-94 (comparing the effects of a full-
scale cyber warfare attack, an "electronic Pearl Harbor," with the devastation,
destruction, and death caused by nuclear weaponry).
275 See Kanuck, supra note 26, at 286 (defining cyberspace as a "borderless
realm").
276 See id. ("Current paradigms of international law focus on a state-based
structure that is preoccupied with the notions of sovereignty and territory. Yet
tomorrow's world will require - and, to a certain degree, today's world already
requires- a reformulation of those concepts . . . .").
277 See Shackelford, supra note 3, at 250 (noting that the best approach to
defining cyber warfare operations under international law may be to adapt and
expand existing international law where possible, and to create new formulations of
law when necessary).
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the revolutionary issues raised by cyber warfare. 278 Consequently,
new international laws may need to be developed, and a new global
legal regime introduced, to effectively deal with cyber warfare
issues.279
Ultimately, while some have argued that extensive renovations
to the international legal paradigm are premature,280 it is critical that
such changes not be delayed, as cyber warfare already possesses
destructive capabilities approaching that of full-scale nuclear war.281
Consequently, further delay in the formation of international treaties,
limiting the use of and defining the status of cyber warfare under
international law, risks devastating global repercussions. 2 82 In the
end, the need for new international legal structures cannot be ignored,
278 As has been observed, cyber warfare represents a new age of military
warfare and strategy, and international law must adapt, evolve, and reinvent itself
to effectively account for this crucial fact. See Kanuck, supra note 26, at 290
(lamenting the fact that "international law still seeks to regulate the conflicts of
yesterday").
279 The proposal regarding terrorism under international law made by
Duncan Hollis could also be effectively used as a template upon which
international law could deal with legal issues raised by cyber warfare. See Hollis,
supra note 84, at 1026-27. Under Hollis's proposal, a new international legal
framework tailored to deal directly with issues of cyber warfare is likely needed.
Id. Specifically, Hollis advocates the creation of an ILIO, or international law for
information operations, which would be constructed and applied specifically
against the backdrop of the emerging problems that cyber warfare have created for
traditional international law. Id. at 1029.
280 See Sinks, supra note 16, at 26 (concluding that the present international
laws already in place can sufficiently address the ever-changing nature of warfare,
including cyber warfare operations); West, supra note 154, at 25 (positing that the
creation of a new international law to deal specifically with cyber warfare would do
more harm than good).
281 See Schaap, supra note 22, at 172-73. Although international law has
historically struggled to keep pace with technological weaponry advances, this only
evidences the fact that the international community needs to act now to "determine
what is and is not permitted under international law in relation to cyber warfare
operations." Id. at 173.
282 See Shackelford, supra note 3, at 251. Given the current, and constantly
advancing, nature of cyber warfare weaponry, the need to regulate this area
becomes all the more necessary. As Shackelford observes, failing to address cyber
warfare, a militarized warfare potentially equivalent to nuclear weaponry, "risk[s]
systematic infrastructure crashes that not only will cripple societies, but also could
shake the Information Age to its foundations." Id.
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and a reevaluation of traditional legal values, combined with a
willingness to completely reinvent the international legal paradigm to
make it specifically applicable to cyber warfare issues, is a reality
that must be accepted and addressed by the global community as a
whole.
